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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES INTO PRESIDENTIAL
PREROGATNE--WHO CONTROLS THEWAR POWERS?
Jay F. Donaldson, M.A:
Western Michigan University, 1994
This paper examines the executive-legislative relations on foreign policy
formuiation, debate, authoriz.ation, funding and implementation. The research shows
that the founding fathers never intended one branch to totally control the "war powers."
Inter-branch rivalry and conflict were intended.
The research establishes a pattern this inter-branch relationship has taken since
the Constitutional Convention. This "pattern" clearly indicates the natural ability of the
executive branch in handling foreign affairs especially those key events involving the
use of force or where the potential for violence exists.
The paper also examines the surge of congressional authority (1970's) which
attempted to apply restraint on what were considered foreign policy excesses by the
executive. Historical practice and constitutional interpretation shows these are
congressional overreactions, Particularly the War Powers Act of 1973, that now
seriously impede effective foreign policy execution. These restrictions are
unconstitutional and demonstrate that presidential prerogative should not be binded by
congressional restraint.
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CHAPTER!

CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY WITIIlN
..
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Foreign policy may be seen as the goals that a nation's government officials
seek to attain abroad, the values that give rise to those objectives, and the means or

-

....
instruments
through which they are pursued (Kegley & Wittkoph, 1982). Seen

..

-

another way, foreign policy can be viewed as a nation's preferred path for maintaining

... prestige.
self-preservation or security, economic sufficiency and national power and

---

The number one goal of foreign policy is not necessarily peace but the

-

.., To preserve the existing political system a
preservation of the existing political system.

...

nation should have extensive control over domestic matters in order to prevent hostile

·..
.
.. .. over domestic
...... •~
.... this control
agreement concerning
-· trade or economic sanctions without
..; an
C
takeovers, revolution etc. It would be impossible to commit people to war or to

matters. It would be safe to say that foreign policy can
• be greatly affected by the
structure of domestic government (Scruton, 1982).

.

When events occur within a particular political system that question or threaten
its ability to deal adequately with foreign situations, then
·• that system's efficiency or
effectiveness is in some doubt. One need only review any of several recent foreign
policy episodes to see the problems United States Government is having in the conduct
of foreign affairs.
One example is the Iran-Contra Affair where members of the National Security

.

' an arms embargo in
... an
Council secretly sold arms to Iran despite the existence of

attempt to free hostages taken earlier by a terrorist group associated with the Ayatollah
Khomeini. This included financial support to Nicaraguan Contra rebels from the
1
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profits of the arms sales despite the Boland Amendment prohibiting such aid. These
types of activities raise many questions about the conduct of overall U.S. foreign
policy. Other related questions have been raised over the years as a result of other
conflicts between the President and Congress. Future chapters deal more with the use
of military forces abroad.
The following questions describe some of the issues that are raised. Is a formal
declaration of war necessary before the President may begin any military action against
a foreign nation? Is it enough if Congress knowingly provides the funds for a military
excursion? What actions may the President take without any form of prior
authorization from Congress? Does the power to defend the nation extend to
preemptive strikes?

Can the executive engage in actions short of war

citizens, property, or the interests of the country?

to protect

Can the President engage in covert

activities in order to subvert foreign governments or political parties? To what extent
may Congress reverse the actions of the executive? To what extent can Congress
control foreign policy and by what means? Is it possible for funds to be denied?
Under what circumstances may the President enter into arrangements with other nations
without submitting them to the Senate for approval as he does with treaties?

Can the

President refuse to give information to members of Congress? If so, what measures
may Congress take to obtain this information themselves? Some of these questions
will be approached directly in the chapters that follow. Others may be addressed in a
general fashion as specific answers are elusive and are still the focus of constitutional
arguments today.
With each succeeding decade there is an increasing number of world crisis
situations. Add to this the growing interdependence of nations and you have all the
ingredients for potential catastrophes. Often decisions must be made with little or no
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time for contemplation or consultation. For the United States to speak with one single
voice is important in order to maintain a degree of both respectability and credibility.
When the foreign policy of past administrations is presented in a proper
historical context, especially key events or crisis situations, it becomes evident who has
participated where and to what extent. This is not something which can be too broadly
interpreted i.e. Congress either did or did not participate, the executive did this and this
etc. Records of American foreign policy are quite accurate and one can see clearly
which branch has participated, in what way and quite often why it was that way.
Chapter Descriptions
1. Chapter II will provide a historical background in constitutional foundations
on conducting foreign policy. It will discuss the concept of "shared" and "mixed"
powers along with general governmental structure and show how certain concepts
began and what may have been the original intent of the founding fathers regarding
foreign policy.
2. Chapter ID documents a growing influence in foreign policy by the
executive branch in the 19th and early 20th centuries during a period recognized as one
of congressional dominance, despite the belief held by some interpreters of the
Constitution that no single branch was supposed to dominate.
3. Chapter IV examines twenty-one individual foreign policy acts in a
miniature case study format which runs from the 1930's to the 1960's. This
examination further documents heavy congressional participation, however, it also
shows those key or crucial events that the executive has come to dominate to also be the
events where the use of force or where the potential for violence was present.
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4. Chapter V examines the actual tools used by the U.S. Government in
implementing foreign policy decisions (treaties, executive agreements, statutory
agreements). This examination also suggests that Congress has participated
extensively in foreign affairs but that the executive has come to dominate foreign policy
making through the control of key or crucial events. Also examined is the executive's
unique ability to gain access to funds needed to complete foreign policy objectives.
This chapter increases understanding of how the instruments of foreign policy have
been shared between the legislature and executive and how money is almost always
available to the executive even though Congress controls the purse strings.
5. Chapter VI will show many of the structural weaknesses within Congress
which limit its ability to respond to crisis situations in a timely or appropriate manner.
It is these structural weaknesses that have given the executive branch the leeway it has
enjoyed in taking the initiative in those situations where quick and decisive action is
needed or where Congress has failed to act or chosen not to act. It also documents the
congressional surge of power to gain influence in foreign affairs during the 1970's.
6. Chapter VII represents the primary focus of this paper. All preceding
chapter's intentions were to give a historical understanding and, partially, a mechanical
view of how American foreign policy has been and is conducted. This background
helps in comprehending the views of this chapter which deal with the constitutionality
of the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
This act represents one of the most controversial attempts by Congress to gain
influence through their interpretation of the war powers expressed in the Constitution.
Along with being examined as a "legislative veto", it looks at foreign policy events
related to the act since its passage and its relation to war powers expressed in the
Constitution.
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7. Chapter VIII returns to the source where many believe the answer to who
should control the war powers, at least partially, lies. A general discussion on war
powers precedes a presentation on the principles of free government and presidential
prerogative. These topics are discussed both in a current context and from the view of
the founding fathers and those who influenced them, particularly John Locke. It is a
fitting way to conclude and affirm the ideas and opinions given in the previous
chapters.
This paper will present several different arenas of executive-congressional
relations in foreign policy. They are brought together first to give an overall view of
such relations and second to examine, specifically, the constitutionality of
congressional initiatives relating to the president's powers as Commander-in-Chief.
This will include basic American government concepts regarding foreign policy and
historical foreign policy practice by various administrations. This body of information
is coupled with:
1. Foreign Policy Case Studies
Neutrality Legislation - 1930's
Lend-Lease Act - 1941
Aid toRu�ia
Repeal of Chinese Exclusion - 1943
FulbrightResolution - 1943
Atomic Bomb - 1944
Truman Doctrine
Marshall Plan
Berlin Airlift - 1948
Vandenburg Resolution - 1948
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North Atlantic Treaty- 1948-49
Korean Decision - 1950
Japanese Peace Treaty- 1952
Bohlen Nomination - 1953
Indo-China - 1954
Formasan Resolution - 1955
International Finance Corporation - 1956
Foreign Aid - 1957
Renewal of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
Monroney Resolution - 1958
Cuban Decision - 1961
These case studies are analyzed through tables which demonstrate:
1. General congressional involvement and decision characteristics.
2. Congressional involvement and violence.
3. Preponderant influence and violence.
International agreements (executive agreements, statutory agreements, treaties)
are also examined in both discussion and tables in areas such as:
1. International Agreement Making - A Continuum of Executive Discretion
(showing "more" or "less" executive discretion).
2. Form of U.S. Agreement by Administration, 1946-1972.
3. Form of U.S. Agreement by Content Areas, 1946-1972.
4. Executive Agreement Index, 1946-1972, (various administrations emphasis
in different policyareas).
5. Dominance of Executive Agreements Over Treaties in the Making of
Significant MilitaryCommitments Abroad.

7
In an effort to add to the study of Congress and foreign policy, internal
structures of Congress are looked at i.e. parochialism, organizational weakness and
controlling the flow of information. These topics are viewed as inherent congressional
weaknesses vis-a-vis foreign policy. What follows is legislative attempts to strengthen
these weaknesses. These attempts were considered by many to be a response to what
Congress considered foreign policy excesses by the executive branch during the
Vietnam War.
1. Cooper Church Amendment
2. McGovern-Hatfield Amendment
3. Eagleton Amendment
4. Fulbright Amendment
5. Foreign Assistance Act
6. Nelson-Bingham Amendments to Arms Export Act
7. Tunney Amendment to Defense Appropriations Act of 1976
8. Clark Amendment to Arms Export Act of 1976
9. Hughes-Ryan Amendment to Foreign Assistance Act.
10. War Powers Resolution of 1973
The War Powers Resolution is examined via:
1. Sections
a Section 2(c) limiting circumstances of involvement
b. Section 3 prior consultation with Congress
c. Section 4 providing detailed reports
d. Section 5(b) time limit and forced withdrawal of troops
e. Section 5(c) direct conflict with Article One, Section Seven of
Constitution
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2. Implementation of Resolution: Twenty examples are given ranging from
Richard Nixon in 1974 to Desert Storm in 1990.
3. Summations and Conclusions focusing on Resolution's effectiveness and
constitutionality.
The paper closes with a return to discussion on constitutional origins
concerning war powers, presidential prerogative and current congressional viewpoints
on the Resolution's import in today's changing foreign affairs climate.

CHAPfER II
ORIGINS AND SPECIFICATIONS OF POWERS IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS WITIIlN THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION
What does the Constitution actually say in allocating power in foreign affairs
between the executive and legislature? Constitutional clauses regarding foreign affairs
are taken out of Articles One and Two and are presented here with a brief discussion
following each clause. These discussions sometimes involve comparisons with the
British Parliament or assessments of the original intent of the articles.
Article One
Article One, Section One states "All legislative powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States." That means Congress has no legislative
power except those "herein granted" i.e., those actually expressed in the Constitution.
In examining this article with respect to foreign affairs, Jack Peltason writes;
The field of foreign relations provides the principal exception to the general rule
that Congress has only those legislative powers granted to it by the
Constitution. As a necessary concomitant of nationality, the Congress, along
with the President, has full power to deal with the external relations of the
United States. Congress has the power to authorize the acquisition of territory
by discovery and occupation and to adopt legislation denying certain kinds of
aliens entrance into the United States, even though these are not among the
legislative powers specifically granted by the Constitution to the Congress. For
the source and scope of such powers one must turn to international law and
practice, not to the Constitution (Peltason, 1982, p. 33).
The ability of Congress to deal with external relations, therefore, is limited.
This distinguishes Congress from the British Parliament which has total and exclusive
legislative powers. Succeeding chapters will more accurately show the areas of
foreign affairs Congress has actually participated in.
9
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Some of the specific powers of Congress identified in Article One, Section
Seven that relate to foreign policy are, for example, raising revenue which begins in
the House of Representatives. Much of what the Executive desires costs money and it
must be appropriated by the Congress. Section Eight is probably the most significant
section. It grants Congress the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and
excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of
the United States. Section Eight also allows Congress influence over piracies or
felonies committed on the high seas. Congress can make any crime under international
law a crime under national law. In the past this has not been important because
international law has dealt mostly with governments instead of individuals. Today,
more recent developments place individuals under these obligations and hence, give
this paragraph more importance.
For an aid to referencing, the following sentences quoting the Constitution are
preceded by the actual number given in the Constitution. Congress' constitutional
powers in regards to foreign affairs continues in Section Eight with the power to:
11. To declare War, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules
concerning captures on land and water.
Letters of marque and reprisal concerned giving citizens the power to attack the
shipping and property of enemy nations and not be considered pirates while doing so.
In Britain these powers belonged to the King, and the purpose of this clause was to
switch that ability to Congress. It has, however, not made any difference. Most of the
wars we have been involved in have begun through actions of our presidents.
12. To raise and support armies but no appropriation of money to that use shall
be for a longer term than two years ...
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This clause, plus other inherent powers of the national government, give greater
powers than anything else in the entire Constitution. With this power people can be
drafted into military service, requisition, allocate and ration materials of all kinds,
control the production, marketing, and consumption of all products, and do whatever is
"necessary and proper" to bring a war to a successful end. The limitation of two years
was to guarantee the army's dependence on Congress. The idea represented a belief in
civilian control of the military.
13. To provide and maintain a navy ...
A navy didn't represent as much of a threat to Congress as a standing army.
The limitation of two years didn't apply as the building of naval ships often took much
more than two years.
14. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces ...
This power is one that is shared with the President and his powers as
Commander-in-Chief during wartime. The Supreme Court has since narrowed the
scope of who is subject to the rules for the regulation of the armed forces. This clause
once meant that people subject to trial in front of military courts were not given the
same procedural rights as civilians. The jurisdiction of the military courts is now more
limited. Civilian employees of the armed forces and civilian dependents of military
personnel with them overseas cannot be tried by court-martial. Ex-soldiers cannot be
tried by the military for crimes committed while they were in service.
15. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof ...
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Note here that Congress was not granted the power to make all laws necessary
and proper for "any purpose whatsoever'' but only those laws which will aid Congress
in executing its enumerated powers (ones spelled out in the Constitution).
The doctrine of "implied" powers may be gleaned from the Necessary and
Proper Clause. An example of an implied power is the power of Congress to pass
laws to draft men into the armed forces. This power has been implied from the power
to raise armies. Additional powers may be attached to an implied power such as the
power to indict those evading or deliberately obstructing the draft. The
acknowledgement of the constitutionality of such second order implications is known
as "penumbra" or "shade" doctrine, the grafting of a power on to an implied power.
Section Nine continues with ...
7. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of
appropriations made by law ...
This clause, more than any other, gives Congress significant power or
influence over the other branches of government. The executive and judicial branches
depend totally on money appropriated by Congress to carry out their functions.
Congress also determines how executive agencies are to account for their expenditures
from appropriated funds.
This concludes the listing of essential legislative powers granted by the
Constitution regarding foreign affairs. Any list would not be complete, however,
without a discussion of the concept of "inherent powers." These are powers used by
the national government in foreign affairs that are not spelled out or even "implied" in
the Constitution. The concept originates with the idea that the United States is one
community in a greater world of many nations, some of which are hostile, and that it
must be able to respond to situations as they arise - situations that were not and could
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not have been anticipated by the Constitution (Peltason, 1982). Both the legislative and
executive branches are perceived to have inherent powers.
One inherent power of Congress is its power to investigate. Congress needs to
gather information so as to legislate, to propose constitutional amendments etc. Each
chamber can subpoena witnesses and punish those who won't release documents or
answer questions. This inherent power was used in the Iran-Contra affair when it held
hearings, called witnesses etc. to determine what in fact happened. Are there limits on
Congress' ability to compel individuals to produce material or answer questions? They
aren't supposed to use their investigatory powers to negatively affect freedoms
protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has said "The power to
investigate must not be confused with any of the powers of law enforcement"
Congress "has no power to expose for the sake of exposure" (Watkins v. United
States, 1957). Even with these statements, the Supreme Court hasn't placed any
substantive restrictions on the scope of Congress's investigative powers.
Although there are numerous other provisions of the Constitution the ones just
presented are the essential ones dealing with the power of Congress in the area of
foreign affairs.
Article Two
Article Two deals with the Executive branch which vests executive power in a
"president" of the United States ofAmerica. What is interesting about this clause is the
fact that the words "herein granted" do not appear as they do in the legislative clause.
Does this give "executive power" to the President himself or does this clause just fix
the title of a man who is given specified duties spelled out in the remainder of the
article? There is what one could call a "majority'' view which falls in line with past
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presidential practices. It is that this section gives the President powers that have never
been defined or enumerated and cannot be defined since it is dependent on
circumstances of the time (Peltason, 1982).
The provisions of Section Two of the Constitution regarding the President and
foreign affairs are as follows:
1. The president shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the
United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into actual service of
the United States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each
of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective
offices ...
As mentioned earlier, Congress shares power over the military with the
President. Congress creates money and makes "regulations for their governance"
while the President can give orders to the army, navy, and air force which might lead to
hostile actions.
Congress has the power to refuse to grant money for military actions or can
place stipulations on how the money might be spent. Past experiences, however, tell
us that Congress has had difficulty in limiting the President in the way he exercises his
powers as Commander-in-Chief. Future chapters will devote considerable attention to
this matter.
2. He shall have the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall
nominate, and by and with the advice of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls ... and all other officers of the United States, whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
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law. But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as
they think proper ...
Here, it is the President who can enter into agreements with other nations and
gives the impression to other nations that it is he who speaks for the United States in
foreign affairs. The Senate has actually done little advising over the years (Sofaer,
1976). The President negotiates the treaty and then presents it to the Senate. The final
step in the treaty process is ratification which is also done by the President. The two
thirds vote by the Senate for approval makes it possible for a minority to stop the treaty
from going into effect. A minority of the Senate has not exercised this power often in
American history but the possibility exists and United States participation in some
international treaties has been held up for years as a result. Since the House of
Representatives must appropriate money to carry out the terms of a treaty, it also has
considerable power in this area. The use of treaties, executive agreements and statutory
agreements is treated extensively in Chapter IV.
3. He shall, from time to time, give to Congress information of the state of the
union and recommend to their consideration, such measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient.
The President speaks to Congress and, since the advent of radio and television,
the nation, in his "State of the Union Message" every year the timing of which
coincides with the opening session of Congress. In this presentation it has become
customary for the President to send messages to Congress, talk to them on specific
subjects, and recommend certain legislation he would like to see passed. In this way
the President can focus national attention on national problems or international affairs if
he so desires.
3. (cont'd.) He shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers ...
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After reading clause two it is apparent that the President is the only person who
can officially speak for the United States when dealing with foreign countries.
Conversely, foreign nations must speak directly through the President or his
representative, the Secretary of State. This power also allows the President to
recognize new nations or governments.
3. (cont'd.) He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall
commission all the officers of the United States ...
This clause gives the President the power to remove all executive officers. To
execute the laws he must have control over those people through whom he operates.
Congress, as we shall see in succeeding paragraphs and throughout this paper, has
authorized the President to use the military forces to handle things which, for various
reasons, are too difficult to be handled by the Congress or the courts in the enforcement
of law. So, the President's duty to see that the laws are enforced is backed up by his
power as Commander-in-Chief. There are numerous other duties and powers given to
the president but these are the essential ones dealing with foreign affairs.
Almost every constitutional argument heard today was advanced in the
Constitution's formative years in one form or another. The statements of the influential
leaders of that time, including the framers of the Constitution, do not give us much
guidance. They were often countered by opposing spokesmen. Some statements were
politically motivated and the speaker is known to have acted in ways inconsistent with
his speech. The actions of these early leaders were a more reliable gauge of their
position than their rhetoric. However, even actions in the early years give us a little
guidance because you can't look at executive or legislative actions as "precedents" like
one would look at judicial decisions. Actions may speak louder than words but not
necessarily as clearly.
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If you are looking for "precedents" that establish some kind of executive or
legislative dominance or exclusive responsibility for a particular branch you will have
difficulty finding them. Since the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention of 1787
the legislative and executive branches functioned as separate entities but with power or
influence over the same matters. These matters include the concluding of treaties,
setting the legislative agenda, and especially the use of U.S. forces abroad.
The greatest area of potential executive power is where there is no direct
confrontation with legislative powers. "Showdowns," or direct confrontations,
haven't happened often. Many of today's problems seem to happen in situations where
Congress has delegated power to the President or where the President has acted in a
legislative "vacuum." An example might be the bold actions taken by Franklin
Roosevelt at different periods throughout the 1930's. The depression was hitting hard
and Congress seemed at a loss as did almost everyone else. Congress, for the most
part, backed up Roosevelt in his bold moves.
There is not much in the Constitution which suggests Congress is at all limited
in its ability to delegate. If Congress, in advance and without limitation, delegated
whole powers that are actually assigned to them in the Constitution such as declaring
war or raising revenues, they would probably be violating their oath to uphold the
Constitution. Short of that situation, it is clear that Congress' power to delegate is very
broad. On that matter Abraham Sofaer stated:
No provision, however, would seem to prevent the legislature from allowing
the executive to plan and draft legislation, prepare the budget, control funds and
information, conduct foreign relations, or even engage in military action upon
findings largely within the President's discretion to make (Sofaer, 1976, p. 45).
When Congress says or does nothing on a certain subject, even one over which
it has direct authority over, does the President have the ability to act at least until
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Congress moves to restrain or direct him? Again the Constitution is vague on this.
The "vagueness," however, seems to favor the President. He has the implicit authority
to defend the nation from attack, to operate as Commander-in-Chief, to faithfully
execute the laws and to be the spokesman to other nations. When combined these
implied and actual powers form a considerable basis for legitimizing almost any
executive action. It is possible for the President to say that, without legislative
direction, he has a "sufficient embodiment of the national sovereignty to exercise its
rights under the law of nations" (Sofaer, 1976, p. 4). There isn't any written law that
supports this but there is a large degree of trust placed in the office of President by the
Constitution and when there is a need to respond to a situation where Congress has
failed or been unable to act the President's actions are likely to be supported.
Historically, they essentially have been, as future chapters will show.
To briefly sum up one could say that the Constitution seems to give Congress
more than adequate powers to effectively influence, possibly even control, foreign and
military affairs. Yet it doesn't stop them from delegating many of their functions to the
President or from surrendering them to the President by allowing him to "assume the
initiative". Did the Constitution really intend to give power in this way? Or were there
sharper lines of separation between the branches of government? Was the President
supposed to be the agent of Congress?
The Constitution has often been called an "invitation to struggle." Its meaning
is often unclear. One has to look at all the available sources for any understanding,
i.e., ratification debates, the minutes of the convention, the views of those who voted
on the relevant provisions and the intellectual, social, economic and political
background of the "participants." A look at the British political system is necessary in
order to see where certain concepts originated.
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Our British Connections
Many of our ancestors came to this continent from Europe, particularly Britain.
They left Europe in fear of and opposition to what they considered an oppressive
government especially in regards to religious freedom. They desired a freedom not to
be found in England or in most parts of Europe at the time.
Our original thirteen colonies developed over a period of a century from
outlying trading posts to fully developed communities. For this analysis differences
between the colonies are unimportant. What is important is that they were all
influenced and shaped by their English origins. Each colony contained the seeds of
democracy which later formed the basis for the joining of the colonies with a national
government. These "seeds" can be partially traced back to the Magna Carta of 1215.
This document was the great charter of freedom granted by King John of England.
Some of the resulting freedoms that can be found in American law are a trial by jury of
one's peers and the guarantee that no person shall lose his life, liberty or property
except by due process of law. Further seeds can be found in the struggle between
England's royal aristocracy and Parliament which will be discussed in future
paragraphs.
The first attempt at establishing a government, as opposed to a group of
separate colonies, brought us the Articles of Confederation which was basically a "firm
league offriendship" among the states. Each colony or state was sovereign within its
own borders. Concerning foreign relations, each state was virtually a nation unto
itself. No "national" government existed to speak for all states.
The Confederation appeared to have substantial powers, on paper. It could
regulate weights and measures, create post offices, borrow and coin money, direct

20
foreign affairs, declare war and peace and provide recruits and money for an army.
Each state, however, was jealous of its own rights and carefully guarded the use of
these powers. The representatives who sat in the Congress were paid by the states and
voted as their state legislatures directed them to vote. Within Congress only one vote
per state was allowed regardless of size. Congress had no real power to lay and collect
taxes and duties. There was no executive to enforce acts of Congress. No national
court system existed. Amendments occurred only with the consent of all the states. A
9/13 majority of states was needed to pass laws. Although each state had its own
democratic structure within its boundaries, there was no national government until the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 which is discussed later in this chapter. Each of
these sovereign states under the Articles of Confederation and later, when united under
a written constitution, were influenced by their background. That background is
English law.
English law could be said to be in the form of an "unwritten constitution." It is
basically a set of customs and traditions developed over the years. Just because a
written document allocating the power and functions of government, procedures for
making decisions and setting limits on government power isn't neatly spelled out does
not mean they don't exist.
Much in the U.S. Constitution was taken from not only Parliament's statutes
but from common law. Common law is primarily a body of legal rules deriving from
judicial decisions. English judges were often presented with cases which did not come
under the statutes enacted by Parliament. Judges usually looked for a fair solution in
the customs and values of the local community.
Although Parliament was powerful, much of British history is reflected in
Parliament's struggle with the Monarchy for control of the nation. There were periods
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where one or the other dominated in ruling the country. These swings of power should
tell us the British Constitutional practice isn't going to give us the neat concise answers
we need to straighten out the vague portions of our U.S. Constitution. The fact is that
both Parliament and the Monarchy took the initiative successfully at different times in
regards to foreign and military affairs just as our Congress and President have done as
later chapters will show.
Parliament has the "power of the purse" just as our Congress does and this
constituted one of Parliaments primary powers in influencing foreign affairs. Despite
this enormous power, the Monarchy (King) found ways to financially support his
excursions. Charles I, for example, called upon local governments to provide ships for
the nation's defense. Whatever Parliament's powers, and they were formidable, they
couldn't be exercised during the frequent periods when they were not in session. At the
time it was thought that the demands of a legislature were not such that Parliament
needed to be in session full time. This left the door open for the King to initiate
actions.
Although clearly our presidential system differs substantially from the
parliamentary system we did inherit a number of items from the British system. They
are: (a) a two-chamber legislature with sole authority to pass laws as well as other
numerous privileges and limitations, (b) all money bills originate in the House of
Representatives as they do in the British Commons, (c) impeachment by the lower
house (House of Representatives) and prosecution by the upper house (Senate), (d)
immunity of legislators during congressional session, and (e) a Chief Executive in
charge of taking care of military and foreign affairs. The British counterpart to this
Chief Executive was the King.
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The American Constitution and the Bill of Rights rejected the idea that rights
and privileges could be overridden by legislation and tried to put specific rights outside
government's ability to change them without a constitutional convention. Even though
it seems our President resembles the British King, the Constitution didn't give the
President the full range of options available to the King, i.e., the power to make
binding treaties without congressional consent or to raise armies and declare war. The
trend in Britain during the 17th and 18th centuries was for Parliament to gain power at
the expense of the King. The real question becomes to what extent was this trend
incorporated into our American Constitution (for Congress to gain power at the
expense of the President).
The most important and well known element in 18th century British
constitutionalism was the doctrine of separation of powers. The British system seemed
to grow along lines where government power was divided on functional lines
(legislative, executive and judicial) with each type of power given to different persons.
But this doesn't explain the overlapping authority that Parliament and the King
experienced and that our Congress and President experience.
A second doctrine gained wide acceptance at that time which helps to explain
some of the inconsistencies of the British political experience. As far back as 1642
British philosopher and politician Bernard Bailyn thought that British political thought
rested on the idea that:
Liberty had been preserved and could be preserved ... by maintaining the
balance in government of the basic socio-economic elements of society: King,
Lords and Commons. ... Pure forms - monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy would degenerate, whereas a 'mixing' of these forms within a single system
could create 'counterpoised pressures' that might keep the system stable and
healthy (Sofaer, 1976, p. 13).
This particular idea assumed the concept of separate branches but with an actual
"mixing" in each branch of all forms of power - legislative, executive and judicial.
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This concept was accepted as proper political doctrine by the early 18th century. So, it
really made sense to think up a system where each important group would have powers
that allowed it to check certain other powers that were given to other groups.
This concept can be understood further when discussed along with the idea of
roya1 prerogative. Prerogative is the
Preeminence which the sovereign retains ... and which other heads of state
retain elsewhere, consisting in certain rights of action allowed no one else in
law ... it includes not only immunities from prosecution but also powers to
initiate actions ... among these actions the conduct of foreign affairs is
particularly important (Scruton, 1982, p. 370).
Philosopher John Locke backed this up well in his description of prerogative:
Where the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands, as they are in
all moderated monarchies and well-framed governments, there the good of the
society requires that several things should be left to the discretion of him that
has the executive power. For legislators not being able to foresee and provide
by laws for all that may be useful to the community, the executor of the laws,
having in the power in his hands, has by the common law of Nature a right to
make use of it for the good of the society, in many cases where the municipal
law has given no direction, till the legislative can conveniently be assembled to
provide for it; nay, many things there are which the law can by no means
provide for, and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has
the executive power in his hands, to be ordered by him as the public good and
advantage shall require; nay, it is fit that the laws themselves should in some
cases give way to the executive power, or rather to this fundamental law of
Nature and government (Sofaer, 1976, p. 127).
It is possible that the constitutional experience of the British may yet give us
some answers to the unanswered questions of the U.S. Constitution. The delegation
of overlapping powers or mixing of powers in Britain was deliberate and it is entirely
possible that certain "ambiguities" of our constitution were also deliberate. It now
needs to be asked whether this British idea of "mixing" was applied to the U.S.
Constitution. Were separate branches of government intentionally given powers
exercisable over the same areas of concern?

The Constitutional Convention
The weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation mentioned earlier became
painfully obvious after several years. Congress, on paper, had all the essential powers
within its hands. They had the exclusive right and power of determining issues of
peace and war, sending and receiving ambassadors and granting letters of marque and
reprisal in times of peace (a commission given to a ship by a government to make
reprisals on a ship of another state). Congress, however, had no power to enforce its
policies on the states. There was no independent executive.
In 1786 an armed revolt by farmers in Massachusetts who desired relief from
foreclosures on mortgages tried to prevent judges from hearing the cases and attempted
to capture an arsenal. Although this didn't seem too serious it did reveal the economic
difficulties that confronted the states at that time. When the governor of Massachusetts
asked for help, Congress lacked the authority to help. They could not invade the
sovereignty of the state. Troops that were authorized to deal with the indians were
diverted to Massachusetts to deal with the situation which later became known as
"Shay's Rebellion." Similar shortcomings of Congress were obvious in trying to
maintain the war with Britain and maintaining order after the war ended. Many
Americans felt a need for a stronger national government.
Americans who wished to see a more influential national government, often
called 'nationalists,' wanted to present their ideas to the country. Their opportunity
came when interstate conferences were held on navigation and commercial matters.
Some nationalists from Virginia suggested that all states send delegates to Annapolis in
September of 1786 to talk about establishing a uniform system of commerce for the
entire country.
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The turnout to this convention was poor (only five states sent delegates),
however, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton persuaded those who did come to
try and salvage something. They drew up a report suggesting all states send delegates
to another convention which was to be held the following May (1787) in Philadelphia.
The report also stated that delegates would be authorized to discuss not only trade
matters but also to analyze the defects in the present system of government.
Even before Congress authorized a convention, many state legislatures,
following Virginia's lead, selected delegates. Congress soon approved but also said
that the delegates should meet
For the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and
reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and
provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the
states render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government
and the preservation of the Union (Sofaer, 1976, p. 67).
This convention was completed within four months without a complete or
reliable record of its deliberations. The delegates met in secret and the journal kept only
recorded formal motions and votes. Notes taken by members were scarce but
invaluable. James Madison's notes were the most extensive along with James
McHenry, William Pierce, William Patterson, Alexander Hamilton and George Mason.
It is possible, however, to relate some general patterns of development. Concerning the
-

Executive Department, the delegates started with the already existing almost powerless
executive and moved to an independent, potentially powerful Presidency. After
considering a number of different plans and propositions a "Committee on Detail" drew
up a draft to present to the rest of the delegates. It was here where the power of the
executive was vested in a "President." It was here where the President became
"Commander-in-Chief' and to make sure that the laws be faithfully executed. What
was missing in this clause was any debate that would have helped clear up the
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confusion about this Commander-in-Chief clause as giving the President an undefined
wealth of power to use in military situations that were unauthorized by Congress.
It was also recommended that the President be elected by a majority vote of an
electoral college composed of electors selected by each state. This gave the President a
political base that was independent of Congress and made the Presidential Office
something much more than an arm of the legislature.
The Committee also recommended that he serve a four year term and be subject
to impeachment if convicted of bribery or treason by a two-thirds vote of the Senate.
This recommendation would appear to reflect an awareness of the President's
independent powers and the need for a legislative "check."
It was during the drafting of these recommendations by the Committee on Detail
that we come to an interesting concept. The actual drafting was entrusted to a
Governor Morris of Pennsylvania who admitted later to making changes in the draft
that he favored (without appearing to violate any of the Convention's agreements). He
changed the "vesting" clause of Article One (Legislative powers) to indicate that the
legislature's authority was limited to the powers enumerated in that article (all
legislative powers herein granted). At the same time he left untouched the vesting
clause in Article Two that simply granted the "executive power'' to a President. It is
here that Morris eliminated the possibility of any implied or unenumerated grants in
Article One and hence gives much ammunition for the argument that the vesting clause
of Article Two was in fact meant to vest all "executive" power not otherwise withheld.
Congress as it is today was the product of the convention. Under the Articles
of Confederation Congress was unicameral (single house) with equal representation of
the people from each state. Two major plans of representation were presented. The
New Jersey Plan favored keeping the single house legislature where all states had equal
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representation regardless of the population. The small states backed this plan because
their vote would count as much as any other state (particularly a larger state). They
didn't want the larger states to dominate the legislature just because they had larger
populations. This plan also did not favor the appointment of a separate Judiciary. They
preferred judges appointed by the President originally chosen by Congress.
The second plan, the Virginia Plan, called for three separate branches: legislative,
executive, and judicial. Congress would consist of two houses (bi-cameral) with
representation of the states based on population. Each plan had a good argument.
Why should a large state like Virginia aUow its vote to be counted the same as
New Jersey's when it contained more people and thus paid more taxes? At the
same time why should a small state like New Jersey voluntarily hand over the
equal status it enjoyed under the Articles and become dominated by larger
states? (Smorston, 1980, p. 48).
Several delegates from Connecticut came up with what would become known
as the Connecticut Compromise. They suggested a two house Congress giving equal
representation in the Senate (two from each state) and representation by population in
the House of Representatives. This would allow veto power to both small and large
states because any legislation passed by Congress would have to have approval from
both chambers.
• Since larger states have most of the taxation burden, all revenue bills
would originate in the House. A Judiciary was also created in the form of a Supreme
Court, appointed by the President with the approval of the Senate along with a lower
court system to be created by Congress.
Conclusions
To sum up, you could say that the framers were essentially concerned with
building the national government's powers but on the road to doing so gave much
attention to how those new powers would be spread among the separate branches. The
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early plans they considered allowed for a weak executive but through the work of
individuals like James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Governor Morris and others,
they gradually built a strong independent executive with considerable powers.
There was nothing done in the Convention that goes against the apparent grants
to Congress of overwhelming authority to control all military decisions (other than
tactical).
The Convention rejected an effort to enable the legislature to define the content
of 'executive power' and to limit the legislature's authority to delegate
'legislative' or 'judicial' power to the executive. This left the President a strong
basis for claiming in future controversies that Congress had overstepped its
authority by interfering with his constitutional powers" (Sofaer, 1976, p. 38).
The Constitution was now void of any restraints on Congress' power to delegate broad
authority to the President.
After intense argument between the states during ratification, the debates seem
to confirm the idea that the President was to take care of diplomacy and negotiations
and to handle all authorized military operations (Sofaer, 1976). The Commander-in
Chief section was interpreted as allowing the President to handle these affairs. George
Washington set a good example during the Revolutionary War when it became obvious
Congress could not effectively direct the war from their chambers. The "commander"
was much more effective in the field. Conditions have obviously changed today and
the President is being challenged on what some consider to be abuse of his own
"prerogative."
Also developed during the Convention was the idea that Congress, and
especially the Senate, would be able to approve or reject foreign policy in exercising
their powers over treaties, appointments and appropriations. Just because Congress
had the power to "declare" war it could not be seen as a limitation on Congress' ability
for formal war-making.

Congress was seen by all who commented on the issue as possessing exclusive
control of the means of war. No ratifier suggested that the President would be
able unilaterally to utilize forces provided for one purpose in some unauthorized
militazy venture. Undeclared wars were far too important a part of the
international scene for one safely to assume that the Framers and ratifiers meant
to leave that area of power to the President (Sofaer, 1976, p. 56).
After examining Convention and ratification debates further and with the quote
mentioned in the previous paragraph in mind, it seems that no argument was given
against legislative delegation of power to conduct foreign and militazy affairs. For
example, the Constitution would not prevent Congress from authorizing the President
to use militazy force under conditions which were largely within his discretion to
determine. There also wasn't any indication that Congress was prevented from
authorizing actions without declaring war. In fact, constitutional reading suggests that
Congress can authorize aggressive acts short of war (Sofaer, 1976).
The ratification debates also failed to consider whether a treaty provision was
deemed, in and of itself, enough to authorize the use of the military to accomplish an
agreed objective, even though the House of Representatives didn't vote on it. Certain
states, however, in the ratification process did give the impression that any militazy
appropriation passed for a specific purpose could amount to legislative approval for the
use of force.
The ratifiers also seemed to give no emphasis on the depth of authority the
President had in defending the United States. In Article One the word "make" was
changed to "declare" concerning Congress' influence on war. This was supposed to
grant power to the Executive to defend the nation against sudden attack but no
discussion took place on whether the President could act without legislative approval if
an attack seemed imminent. There wasn't even any discussion on what an "attack"
was. Once the troops were raised, the President was expected to command them.

29

30
There seemed to be limits on how far the President could go in completing these
functions but not very --clear limits.
In a debate on the 1973 War Powers Resolution, Senator Mark Hatfield quoted
a 1789 letter written by Thomas Jefferson to James Madison which read
We have already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of War by
transferring the power of letting him loose from the executive to the legislative
body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay (Turner, 1991, p.
97).
Hatfield thought this statement supported his own view of broad congressional war
powers with respect to debate on activities taking place in the Persian Gulf at the time.
Two versions of this letter exist in the archives of the Library of Congress. The
one in Madison's files (quoted by Hatfield) mentions the power of "letting the Dog of
War loose" while the copy Jefferson kept for his own records mentions the power to
declare war. Both versions seem to represent the same meaning.
But the most remarkable thing about Jefferson's statement was his assertion
that the power to declare war had been transferred by the new Constitution from
the executive to the legislative branch. Under the Articles of Confederation,
since there was no executive, all war powers were expressly vested in the
Continental Congress (with consequences widely recognized to be disastrous).
Yet clearly indicated that the new Constitution had transferred the power to
declare war, a recognition that this power was by its nature executive (Turner,
1991, pg. 58).
Many of the people of the various states during ratification were afraid of the President
using the troops improperly to the point of suppressing liberties and ruining the
constitutional system. Obviously the President's command didn't extend this far. But
could the President use his powers without legislative orders in a way that would cause
war or make war more likely? Could he control foreign negotiations and represent the
nation's position in such a way as to make aggressive action more likely? Could he
just refuse to negotiate where such a refusal meant war? Could he, in commanding
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troops for instance, move the troops to a disputed area where he was likely to meet
armed resistance? Very little evidence is available on these matters.
It seemed as though people from most ofthe states expected there to be conflict
between the legislative and executive branches and they didn't necessarily want
Congress to dominate (as the Constitution might indicate). In the Federalist, Alexander
Hamilton talked about a President who would risk both popular and legislative
disapproval by opposing policies he thought contrary to the nation's interests.
Opposition would have to be based on some type ofargument or claim that there was
an executive authority independent oflegislative command (although not always
beyond the legislature's power to control in the final analysis). James Madison gave
the most convincing argument when he discussed how the Constitution "intentionally
'mixed' powers so as to create a separation ofthe branches designed primarily to insure
their independence ofwill rather than a separation along functional lines" (Sofaer,
1976, p. 58). Evidence ofthis can be found by examining papers 37 and 38 ofthe
Federalist.
This "mixing" theory needed an overlapping assignment ofpowers so each of
the branches could establish an independent course ofaction and still maintain a
constitutional balance or propriety. So, the open "holes" or unanswered questions in
much of the Constitution "are only uncertainties in the sense that the outcome of
struggles between the branches in such areas is not preordained; their existence should
probably be regarded as intentional, an integral part ofthe constitutional plan" (Sofaer,
1976, p. 58).
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Summation
Alexander Hamilton (1961) defended the many powers given to Congress by
saying that "every government ought to contain in itself the means of its own
preservation" (p. 362). This is exactly what was done by the Framers in planting the
seeds of American democracy. In defending the clause granting Congress all powers
necessary and proper to exercise their responsibilities, Hamilton believed the clause
was not all that essential because a necessary and proper clause is implied in every
grant. So, both Madison and Hamilton not only combined the doctrines of separation
and mixing in their writings but also included John Locke's description of
"prerogative" which saw an executive with the power to do what was necessary
though at the risk of being overruled or punished. Chapter VIII expands on Locke's
view of prerogative.
The Constitution incorporated a very basic aspect of the British system.
Through the notes and writings of those involved in the Constitutional Convention and
the ratification debates it can be seen that it was expected that the branches would battle
each other in acquiring and defending their power. The powers were mixed so as to
prevent any one branch from dominating; each branch was given important powers
over the same area of activity. The experience our Framers had with the British and
our own Confederation led them to
Avoid regarding controversy between the branches as a conflict between good
and evil or right and wrong, requiring definitive, institutionally permanent
resolution. Rather, they viewed such conflict as an expression of the
aggressive and perverse part of human nature that demanded outlet but had to
be kept from finding lasting resolution so that liberty could be preserved
(Sofaer, 1976, p. 60).

CHAPTER III
EXECUTIVE GROWTH
With a few exceptions, the pre-revolutionary period up through and well into
the 20th century was a period of dominance for Congress in their ability to influence
foreign policy (Abshire, 1979). As certain world conditions developed and unique
situations arose which had never been dealt with before, the executive grew in
influence. This chapter will examine some of the actions key presidents took which
were the seeds of what would eventually become known as the "imperial presidency."
George Washington was already mentioned earlier in regards to sanctioning the
powers of Commander-in-Chief with Congress being unable to operate in the
battlefield effectively. Thomas Jefferson continued this emphasis in his administration.
In 1807 the British ship Leopard attacked the U.S. ship Chesapeake. Jefferson
authorized the purchase of arms and ammunition without congressional approval and
actually made a point of doing so without calling Congress back into session.
Jefferson also had a problem in the Mediterranean with Barbary pirates looting
American ships. Two large frigates were sent to cruise the Mediterranean. One ship
ran aground and the crew was imprisoned in Tripoli. Jefferson then sanctioned the
release of a much larger squadron which succeeded in bombarding the pirates into
submission and securing the release of prisoners. So, Jefferson was the first president
to send naval forces abroad without congressional consent. He was also the first
president to interfere in the internal affairs of another nation when he attempted to
overthrow one of the leaders of a Barbary nation by dispatching 1,000 marines and
authorizing $20,000 to subsidize other forces.
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Jefferson was prone to withhold facts from Congress. In the more famous
case of the Aaron Burr treason trial, Jefferson first espoused the principle of executive
privilege by saying it was for the president to be the sole judge as to whether it was in
the "public interest" for a sensitive document in the possession of the executive to be
made public (even though he sent the documents that were requested).
In 1845 when Mexico refused an American envoy offering to purchase New
Mexico and California, after Mexico claimed the Nueces River and not the Rio Grande
as their boundary lines, President James Polk ordered U.S. forces to the Rio Grande
area. The General in command of those forces said that Mexico considered their march
as an act of war and would drive us out if they felt confident enough. Polk knew he
could not gain a declaration of war from Congress simply because Mexico's President
refused an envoy. Fortunately for Polk, some small fighting broke out and so he
drafted a new message asking Congress to give a war declaration against Mexico. At
the time a freshman congressman by the name of Abraham Lincoln said that allowing
the President to make war against a neighboring nation, whenever he wishes simply to
repel an invasion allows him to make war at pleasure.
It seems strange after making such a statement that Lincoln would carry the
war-making powers of the President far beyond what Polk had envisioned. The
following could be said of Lincoln's conduct during the Civil War:
The assumption by the Federal Government of powers of unprecedented
breadth, even though nominally for the period of the war crisis only,
established a precedent and conditioned the minds of the people for a similar
exercise of broad powers in later years, whether in war crisis or otherwise.
Within the government the assumption of unprecedented powers by the
President and his strategy of putting Congress in a position where, instead of
determining governmental policy, it could not do otherwise than sanction
policies already initiated by the President, provided a handbook for those of his
successors who in future years sought to escape the domination and avert the
interference of Congress (Swisher, 1954, pg. 273).
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In 1861, with a standing army of 16,000 men, Lincoln proclaimed a state of
insurrection in response to the firing on Fort Sumter. He called for the states to come
up with 75,000 militia volunteers. He told his Secretary of the Treasury to distribute
$2 million to private citizens to buy supplies and equipment. He ordered a blockade of
southern ports. Later, he asked for 42,000 more militia and 40,000 volunteers for the
regular army and navy, all without congressional authorization. By the time Congress
was in session, Lincoln had 186,000 men under arms.
Lincoln also allowed military commanders to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
(a court order directing an official who has a person in custody to bring the prisoner to
court and to show cause for his being detained). The Constitution provided that this
writ not be suspended "unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety
may require it." But it did not make clear whether the Congress or the president might
authorize such suspension. It is possible to say that Lincoln assumed semi-dictatorial
powers during the war. The real paradox is that most of Lincoln's actions had popular
support and strong backing from Congress (showing that Congress does, indeed,
delegate powers).
Even though Congress had backed much of Lincoln's actions there was a
strong congressional backlash in the affairs of government with Congress taking the
lead in many areas after the Civil War. After about three decades of this"congressional
government" the Spanish-American War was to bring in a new era of Presidential
government.
It was around this period that the concept of"manifest destiny'' started coming
to fruition. This was a doctrine, or more accurately a"notion," which stated that it was
the duty and fate of the United States to expand to the Pacific and beyond. "To a large
extent, it was a pro-inteiventionist Congress and press that pushed President McKinley
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into the very war that resulted in a so-called imperial role, a new manifest destiny on
the world scene" (Abshire, 1979, p. 30). The war with Spain over Cuba extended to
naval operations in the Philippines. America decided to keep control of the islands
despite Filipino insurrection and even in face of the fact that the declaration of war
made no mention of the Philippines. By the end of 1898 they were placed under the
control of a military government. U.S. Senator Jacob Javits said that there was now a
government of a foreign territory put in place "solely by a combination of the executive
authority and the Commander-in-Chief power of the President of the United States"
(Javits, 1973, p. 160-161).
McKinley found his strongest public support when he talked about maintaining
U.S. hegemony in foreign lands. The feeling in the country at that time seemed to
favor a strong president. McKinley's successor, Theodore Roosevelt, was just that.
In 1902, when Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm the Second sent a fleet to Venezuela to
capture ports as a repayment for bad debts, Roosevelt sent a U.S. fleet on maneuvers
as a warning to the Germans. In 1903 he occupied Panama and later said "The
Constitution did not explicitly give me the power to do what I did - it did not forbid me
to do what I did. I therefore did my best to get the Senate to ratify what I had done"
(Javits & Kellerman, 1973, p. 169). Roosevelt also completed secret agreements
which offered the Japanese our assistance in case of European intervention and granted
Japan "protectorate" over Korea.
Theodore Roosevelt was quoted as saying "I did not usurp power, but I did
greatly broaden the use of Executive power. I did and cause to be done many things
not previously done by presidents and the heads of departments" (Milton, 1944, p.
169).
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The William Taft administration which followed Roosevelt continued the
support of strong presidential powers. Taft said that the president could order the army
and navy anywhere in the world "if the appropriations furnished the means of
transportation." He also said that the president could bring the nation into war and
leave Congress no option but to declare or recognize its existence.
Woodrow Wilson followed suit with his administration. When Mexican
American relations had decayed he had marines capture the port of Vera Cruz in 1914.
He followed this up with a military excursion into Mexico led by General John J.
Pershing.
Years earlier, in 1885, Wilson had already completed his doctoral thesis which
was a stinging attack on congressional government. In it he argued that Congress was
not predictable or accountable. It had no readily apparent leader including the Speaker
of the House. Power was not concentrated. Wilson called it "government by standing
committees of the Congress." It avoided strong debate on the floor and put the real
action in the committee room. To Wilson, a widely spread division of power meant
more irresponsible use of power. In other words, a confusion of authority existed.
Wilson failed in his attempt to enjoin the United States in the League of
Nations. "Had there been the will and the means for consultation, compromise and
partnership, the treaty (containing the league proposal) could have passed. As it was,
Wilson's adamant stand opened the way for congressional government for the next 20
years" (Abshire, 1979, p. 20). The administrations of presidents following Wilson,
that of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover were basically isolationist in both branches of
government.
Along with the congressional weaknesses mentioned by Wilson, upon which
Chapter VI expands, it is possible to come up with five more reasons behind the rise of
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presidential dominance. The first and most convincing reason is the increase of
international commitments and crises. Someone once said of Theodore Roosevelt that
if he didn't have a real crisis he would invent the atmosphere of one because he
believed that crises maximize presidential power.
A second reason is what political scientist Clinton Rossiter calls "the positive
economic state... a twentieth century phenomenon that the state activates, regulates,
stimulates, and operates in all stages of economic life" (Abshire, 1979, p. 33). A third
reason, once again referring to Rossiter, is the strange paradox of congressional
expansion. The idea here is that Congress can't seem to expand its power without
increasing the power of the executive at the same time. For instance, if Congress gave
a greater role to the president in domestic emergencies then they had to give the
president the power to enforce the laws, as it did in the Taft-Hartley Act (the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947).
The fourth reason which grew out of this "expansion" is the institutionalization
of the presidency which will be discussed in more detail in following paragraphs. The
fifth reason is that strong presidents became leaders of Congress. After the tum of the
century presidents were expected to have in-depth legislative programs and to get
involved in trying to get them through Congress.
Congress had become so decentralized and cumbersome that it could not
operate in 'grand style' without effective external leadership. The great
twentieth century presidents readopted this dimension of Washington's first
presidency, which demanded the skills that Alexander Hamilton had developed
to dominate the legislative process of the first Congress. All of the dominant
presidents thereafter used these skills, as witness Jefferson, Jackson, Polk,
Lincoln, Wilson, and the two Roosevelts (Abshire, 1979, p. 34).
At the conclusion of Chapter Il it can be seen that the Constitution was
deliberately designed to be an "invitation to struggle." The Constitution by itself,
though, is not really sufficient to explain the distribution of foreign affairs powers as it
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has evolved to its present state. What has given the executive so much leeway in more
recent years? The answer to this question and much of the remaining discussion in this
and following chapters will use situations or specific events from post World War Two
foreign affairs. It is at this point in history that America was thrust into the position of
global leader with global responsibilities.
The decade prior to World War Two, however, sets the stage for true executive
dominance. The emergence of the Franklin Roosevelt administration planted the seeds
of presidential preeminence. It was the New Deal, a term now used to describe policies
used to counteract the effects of a devastating depression, that brought large measures
of government intervention primarily in the area of economics. It included positive
encouragement of private industry along with state financed industries and the
introduction of welfare legislation.
The New Deal involved a radical departure from the previous U.S. fiscal
policy, of trying to secure a balanced budget, and had wide-ranging effects
which have often been thought to be beneficial. It introduced the first
substantial element of a mixed economy into the U.S., together with
expectations associated with welfare legislation (Scruton, 1982, p. 321).
It was essentially Roosevelt's actions and proposals which Congress accepted,
for the most part, that turned the focus of power around, or more accurately, created a
focus of power where there was none. The success of his efforts and winning
personality won him consistent reelection. He was seen as responsible for pulling the
country out of much of the depression and this success was bound to increase the
general power of the presidency. His success, however, was mostly on the domestic
scene. Foreign policy during his first two terms was still basically in the hands of
Congress and remained isolationist in nature. This stance began to change with the
changing nature of the executive office and the advent of World War Two.
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Nonetheless, his actions on the domestic scene help strengthen the overall presidency
which extended to foreign affairs.
What has become known as the "institutional presidency" started in 1939 when
certain recommendations made to Roosevelt by the Brownlow Committee (led by Louis
Brownlow - Roosevelt's Chairman of his Committee on Administrative Management)
were enacted into law. The committee basically stated that the President needed help in
accomplishing both foreign and domestic national goals. The committee stressed more
intense use of staff as the primacy solution. New staffand agencies within the
executive office began to spring up and the seeds of the institutional presidency were
born. The White House Office and the Executive Office of the President (EOP) were
created. It moved the Bureau of the Budget which had been in the Treasury
Department to the EOP thus making it a direct instrument of presidential authority. Six
presidential assistants were assigned to the White House who were to serve as personal
advisors to the President. This new "Executive Office of the President" which used to
be mainly the Bureau of the Budget, now was to serve successive presidents and allow
for some consistency within the "institution" and help to accomplish those national
goals.
After World War Two the institutional presidency increased in size and scope
through the creation of new advisocy units; the Council of Economic Advisors (1946);
the National Security Council (1947); the congressional liaison staffwhich was created
informally in the White House office in the 1950's; the president's science advisor and
professional staff(1958) and the newly created independent agencies that were placed
under the presidential umbrella, including the CIA (1947), the Office of Economic
Opportunity (1964), the Environmental Protection Agency (1970), and a host of
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smaller EOP units such as the Council on Environmental Quality (Hargrove & Nelson,
1984, p.175-176).
It was mentioned earlier that many of Roosevelt's proposals were accepted by
Congress. This is a key statement because many of the forces creating increased power
for the presidency were not being challenged. The Vandenburg Resolution (1949)
where Congress desired a permanent American alliance with other nations of Europe,
which later became NATO, and a list of other resolutions such as Formosa Straits
(1955), Middle East (1957), Cuban (1962), and the Gulf of Tonkin (1964) are all
examples in which Congress gave the president broad, sweeping congressional support
for handling foreign conflict situations.
This fostered presidential supremacy by demonstrating a unity of purpose
between the President and Congress. The ascendancy of presidential power in
foreign policy making came about not so much because recent presidents have
seized power as because Congress itself encouraged executive leadership in the
postwar atmosphere (Kegley & Wittkoph, 1982, p. 320).

CHAPTER IV
LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY:
CASE STUDIES, 1930'S TO THE 1960'S
The title of this chapter suggests a huge number. of events when one thinks of a
thirty year span of America's past relations with foreign nations especially in the post
World War Two period. It would be virtually impossible and most likely inefficient to
try and analyze such a large number of events.
The specific events given here in a miniature case study form are not totally
representative of U.S. foreign policy. They are, however, representative of nearly all
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the published case studies of individual foreign policy acts and offer brief microcosms
of post World War Two executive-legislative relations. At the close of almost every
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case it is indicated whether Congress took a dominant part, a minimal part, or no part at
all in the event.
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Virtually all statistical data can be found to have certain imperfections which
would be misleading if not pointed out. It would be appropriate to note several defects
in the data before being read. One negative aspect of these cases is that all but two
were decided over fairly long periods of time. "Decision time" is often brought up as a
key factor afTecting the degree of congressional participation in foreign affairs. If more
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cases of importance involving short decision time were included, the chances of greater

... participation would be slim. Chapter VI more closely examines
congressional
congressional weaknesses which prevent Congress from reaching any consensus when
short decision time is involved.
There are also few cases of congressional initiative. One should note the
difference, though, between initiative and influence. The absence of attempts of
42
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congressional initiative might be an indication of little previous success and a
consequent decision to "leave it to the executive." The case studies are nonetheless
intriguing and do bring out some interesting points which will be addressed following
their presentation.
1. Neutrality Legislation in the 1930's
Here, neutrality refers to the "legal status" of a nation which does not partake in
any wars with other nations. Such a nation may defend its own territory but not take
any action which would favor a particular side in a confrontation. After World War
One many people in the United States felt there was no need to become heavily
involved in the problems of other nations, particularly Europe.
Neutrality with other nations was an issue that was brought up several times
during the first two administrations of Franklin Roosevelt. One background aspect that
set the atmosphere for debate was the Nye Committee which investigated the arms trade
and munitions making in the United States. Even though they were mostly concerned
with making arms and selling them, they aroused much opposition to internationalism
in general and especially to the idea of"collective security'' (entering into pacts with
other nations to come to one another's defense under certain circumstances).

In the early part of Roosevelt's administration, the executive prepared a
resolution on neutrality which would have given the president the power to embargo
arms to an aggressor. The House of Representatives passed the resolution as presented
but the Senate amended it to apply to all aggressors. The issue of whether it should
apply to all or only some aggressors (at the president's discretion) was one of the
continuing arguments regarding neutrality. The bill died in the House. It was
Roosevelt's first foreign policy defeat.
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The neutrality issue came up again in 1935. Senators Gerald Nye and Bennett
Clark offered a resolution which prohibited American citizens from travelling on the
ships of aggressor nations and prohibiting any loans or credit to the government of any
aggressor nation. Soon after that another resolution was introduced to stop arms
shipments to all aggressor nations. Agreement could not be reached on a given
resolution. Conversations followed between the President, Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee along with other State Department leaders and the
resolutions were recalled and a subcommittee was appointed.
The House and Senate still could not come to an agreement. The Senate came
up with a resolution which favored giving the President discretionary power in
choosing what nation would be the recipient of an arms embargo. The House came up
with a resolution which would allow for a mandatory arms embargo against all
aggressor nations.
The complexity of the neutrality issue of the 1930's is woefully represented
here in these brief paragraphs, however, it does point out some essential principles in
the debate: the initiative for legislation originally came from the executive in 1933, but
Congress did not give the President the discretionary authority he wanted in choosing
which aggressor nation would be the target of an arms embargo. Hence, Congress
took the initiative in requiring a mandatory arms embargo on shipments to all aggressor
nations. Congress kept this stance from 1935 to 1939. After this point a concept that
started in the House debates in 1935 called "cash and carry" was used. This concept
"provided that American manufacturers could sell arms to foreign countries only if the
legal transfer of ownership was made prior to the goods leaving the United States and
if they were shipped in the vessels of other countries" (Robinson, 196 7, p. 26).
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2. Lend-Lease of 1941
Because of world situations in the early 1940's (Germany's rise to power, etc.)
Congress authorized the President to manufacture or acquire any defense equipment for
use by any government of any nation whose defense he considered essential to
America's security. This included "any article, industrial or other commodity or article
for defense." It allowed the President to "sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or
otherwise dispose of any item related to the support of the Allied cause, including
weapons, food, raw materials, machine tools, and other strategic goods" (Plano &
Olton, 1982, p. 178-179). The president would be the one to set the conditions in
which any foreign nation would receive this aid.
The idea didn't start with Congress nor was the law drafted in Congress. It
was prepared by the General Counsel to the Secretary of the Treasury (within the
executive) and his assistant. After a beginning draft, discussions were held with
congressional leaders. It was passed with little change. One of the changes did tum
out to be quite significant and that was the "billion-three clause" in which the value of
any defense articles that were to be transferred could not be more than three billion
dollars.
This act cancelled the "cash and carry" concept accepted earlier in the late
thirties. It turned out to be the turning point from an isolationist stance to one of active
involvement in support of European allies engaged in the war with Germany.
Congress's role in this decision was essentially that of a legitimator of the ideas
presented to it by the executive branch (with small amendments added).

3. Aid to Russia - 1941
At the opening of World War Two, Russia was considered an ally of the United
States in light of Germany's efforts to overtake most of Europe. After Germany's
invasion of Russia the United States made available large amounts of aid to the Soviets
(over 11 billion dollars). This was done under the Lend-Lease Act. There was some
opposition. Congressmen feared Soviet Bolshevism. Although Congress would not
stop the use of Lend-Lease funds for Russia, they were hesitant to publicly take notice
of the fact that the President was on the verge of using such funds once the act was
extended and the appropriations made. Many members were still hesitant to give
explicit, open support.
Well before Congress actually settled the Lend-Lease questions, the President
planned sooner or later to use Lend-Lease to aid the Soviet Union. In one sense,
Congress was part of the framework for gaining public support for the President. So,
Congress was not the initiator of this policy. Once again they were the legitimator of
the President's eventual use of Lend-Lease to aid Russia.
4. Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion - 1943
If Congress has ever taken the initiative, at least in regards to the State
Department, it is with immigration. Studies by Lawrence Chamberlain have shown
that from 1880 to 1945 Congress has been dominant over the executive in being the
initiator of immigration legislation, especially the content of that legislation (Robinson,
1967).
The repeal of Chinese exclusion laws shows the legislature's dominance over
the executive in immigration policy. There was a series of acts by Congress stretching
back 40 or 50 years where Chinese immigrants were systematically excluded from

46

47
entering the United States or even applying for citizenship. During the Second World
War there existed an obvious inconsistency in immigration policy. For instance, the
United States was an ally of China and at war with Japan yet its immigration policy
was in favor of the Japanese and discriminated against Chinese.
A number of citizen groups outside of Congress pressured the legislature to join
the cause of repealing the Chinese Exclusion. Members of the State Department also
wanted the repeal of the discriminatory policy but were privately hesitant to see the
issue come out into the open because unless the discriminations were repealed, it could
be embarrassing to even think about the legislation. Several congressmen felt that "it
was better to suffer the indignity of the inconsistency between the wartime alliances and
immigration policy, than to bring to the floor a proposal which might fail" (Robinson,
1967, p. 30). So, certain members of the State Department warned members of
Congress against handling the subject on the House floor unless they were sure of its
passage.
It was suggested that leadership within Congress should try to determine the
"attitude" of both the House and Senate before hearings got started. Although action
was delayed for a time, the immigration acts were repealed and the Chinese were placed
under a quota system and treated much like other nationals. In this instance Congress
initiated action and the State Department played the role of "cautionary legitimator."
Here, the roles were reversed.

5. Fulbright Resolution - 1943
As was mentioned in Chapter III the United States expanded its role in world
affairs during and after World War Two. Many new responsibilities were taken on.
Even before the end of the war congressmen and citizen groups were concerned about
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the role of Congress in postwar foreign affairs involvement. Congress did not want to
be held responsible for any defeat in postwar collaboration with other countries as the
Senate was held responsible for the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles after World War
One. The executive branch was also thinking about how leading members of Congress
could be involved in the structure of postwar policy.
One method of accomplishing this was a series of congressional resolutions
brought out in 1943. These resolutions, in rather general language, stated that the
United States should "anticipate postwar participation in international organiz.ation for
the presetvation of world peace." It was never clear why this particular resolution was
picked from other, similar resolutions to be passed.
It was Congressman J.W. Fulbright who worked for the resolution's passage
in 1943. Besides congressional support, he found he needed support from the
executive branch. Most historians and various political analysts have thought this was
an example of strong congressional initiative. This is true, however, the
communications between Fulbright and the President, Secretary Hull and the President,
plus Roosevelt and an unnamed historian, show the resolution may not have passed
without the support of the executive. The executive actually participated actively with
congressional leaders in setting the time when such a bill or resolution would be
brought up on the House floor.
In the fall of 1943 more resolutions of a similar makeup were introduced. One
of President Roosevelt's friends, Itving Brant, a biographer, made his concern known
that for such a resolution to pass the language would have to be compromised greatly.
So much so as to negatively affect the administration later. Roosevelt didn't feel the
same and expressed this in a written reply to Brant.
I think that in many ways you are right, but I wonder how much weight should
be attached at this time to any Senate or House Resolution. Remember the
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water is going over the dam very fast these days and what language is used
today may be wholly out of date in a week or two. Frankly, I am paying very
little attention to the language of the debate.
The affairs of"mice and men" are
•
becoming
Personal File 7859,
•
••• less and less affected by verbiage (President's
Oct. 27, 1943).
4

In other words, Roosevelt thought that all this activity was"marginal" and that
he wouldn't be affected much by it later. Although Mr. Fulbright took the initiative for
this resolution it depended much on the will of the executive and it was highly unlikely
that it would have passed over any solid opposition from the executive.
6. The Atomic Bomb - 1944
One of the major arguments during World War Two was whether the dropping
of the Atomic bomb actually shortened the war. Most policy makers agreed that it
would. It was, at the time, considered one of the biggest gambles of the entire war. It
follows that the decision to build the bomb was also a major gamble. The total cost of
research and production of the bomb was approximately $2 billion dollars. Congress,
as keeper of the"purse" obviously had a role. What was that role in authorizing and
appropriating funds?
Senator Harry Truman was a member of a committee whose purpose it was to
investigate the national defense program. In 1944 several investigators went to Oak
Ridge Tennessee to study the plant that was supposed to be producing the bomb.
Nothing significant came of the visit and after a short time investigators were
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summoned home and no further inquiries were made.
Later in 1944 the War Department (now Department of Defense) found that they
needed more funding to continue research and production as they had exhausted all
other funding sources. Members of the executive branch visited with the Speaker of
the House, then Sam Rayburn, and requested an unusually large amount of money
without saying what it was intended for. Rayburn contacted the majority and minority
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leaders of the House and these men in tum negotiated with the Appropriations
Committee leaders and the request for money went through without any debate. The
Democratic Floor Leader in the Senate, Alben Barkley, and the Republican Senate
leader, Styles Bridges, were also informed. Finally in 1945 General Leslie Groves,
head of the Manhattan Project, led some congressmen through the laboratories at Oak
Ridge.
In this case Congress was represented by some of its more well known leaders.
Besides these individuals and their close associates, information about the purpose of
the funding request was not revealed. "The power of the purse, which ordinarily is
used to investigate or instigate action was in this case used to legitimate the executive
program to which the executive attached a very high value" (Robinson, 1967, p. 37).
7. The Truman Doctrine
As much as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are thought of as one
and the same, it is the Truman Doctrine that is specifically related to the supply of aid to
Greece and Turkey. Early in 1947 the British Ambassador in Washington D.C. told
the State Department that his government was going to withdraw any aid to Greece and
Turkey. The United States saw this as a potentially dangerous move. It could alter the
balance of power in the region thereby affecting the influence of the United States in
that area. The civil war in Greece and the strategic importance of Turkey was central in
America's decision to send aid. These two countries could soon be occupied by
nations not friendly with the United States if aid was not sent.
The "vacuum" left by Britain was filled by the State Department who sought
legislation from Congress authorizing the Export-Import Bank to allow credits to
Greece and Turkey without any of the usual restrictions given on long term financial
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aid. Also included would be the shipping of military supplies to both countries
including any additional supplies and equipment needed. It would also include lending
U.S. personnel to Greece to help in administrative, economic, and financial work of
the Greek government.
The Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, made a dramatic appeal in
Congress illustrating all the negative consequences that could affect America if Greece
and Turkey lost their independence. The appeal impressed Arthur Vandenberg, the
leading republican in Congress. At future meetings a program outline was agreed upon
and the aid plan was set into motion.
From this point on, the part of Congress can be seen as, once again, a
legitimator of the executive's proposals with their own amendments thrown in. It was
interesting, though, that the party of the opposition, the Democratic Party, should join
the Republican controlled executive in such a substantial aid program to these
countries. It turned out to be one of the high points of bipartisanship in the postwar
era. Here, congressional approval meant Republican approval and thus gave a clear
stamp of approval with wide support throughout the United States.
Vandenberg also made some strong amendments to the program. One of them
was that under certain conditions the President would have to withdraw any or all aid in
the program. These conditions included "any decision by the United Nations General
Assembly or Security Council that such action or assistance was no longer necessary or
desirable." This amendment "had the effect of reducing the opposition of those people
who felt that the United States was bypassing the United Nations in taking action in
Greece and Turkey" (Robinson, 196 7, p. 40-41). This amendment was never used but
it did represent a new innovation for Congress, i.e. in addition to increasing the internal
support for the President's program it also focused attention to America's
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responsibilities under the United Nations. Congress who had, twenty or thirty years
earlier, been thought of as obstructing international cooperation was now focusing in
on the attention of American government in relation to the interests of international
organization.
8. The Marshall Plan - 1947 to 1948
At Harvard University in 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall gave a
commencement speech detailing reports of difficulty in meeting some of Europe's
economic needs following postwar devastation {which was also partially related to
Britain's withdrawal of aid to Greece and Turkey). He suggested that the European
nations should participate with the United States in formulating aid projects which

.. The initiative for policy
would help them the most. European nations responded.
suggestions rested with the U.S. representatives working in cooperation with European
leaders.
Simultaneously, the House of Representatives appointed a select committee to
look into Marshall's proposal. Christian Herter was the committee's vice-chairman
who traveled throughout Europe and visited some of the countries who would be
recipients of this aid. After returning, their report backed up the original executive
request for interim aid "pending further development of the Marshall Plan."
It is obvious that the recognition of need demonstrated by these European
nations came from the executive branch and from European governments (Robinson,
1967). Even though Herter's select committee helped to make several suggestions
which eventually found their way into the Marshall Plan, the essential goal of the
committee was to legitimate the primary ideas of the executive. In other
• words, the
committee gave support to the idea that large-scale aid was necessary.
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After the committee's report, President Truman submitted legislation for the
European Recovery Program. The hearings conducted were long and intensive. There
were more than one thousand pages in the Senate records and two thousand pages in
the House records. Even though several amendments by Senator Arthur Vandenberg
were accepted into the plan, the initiative for the plan began with the executive. The
major responsibility for coming up with alternative proposals also rested with the
executive. The role of Congress was, again, one of legitimator and slight modifier.
9. The Berlin Airlift - 1948
One of the more controversial situations during World War Two came at the
end when Germany was divided among the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and
France. The Soviets had quickly occupied much of Eastern Europe. Fears arose of
possible future confrontations with the Soviet Union. The "cold war" had begun. In
the summer of 1948 the Soviet government put up a blockade dividing West Berlin
from West Germany either by railroad or car. The Western governments responded by
staging an airlift of various supplies to the needy city of Berlin. It defeated the purpose
of the blockade without starting any violent action. Nonetheless, it was a risky
decision to make not knowing how the Soviets would respond.
This was, essentially, an action taken by the executive branch. Historians
accounts of this event record no consultation with Congress. This doesn't mean that
absolutely no consultations happened but if they did they were minor and insignificant.
There wasn't any legislation to deal with that Congress could legitimate and there didn't
seem to be any effort of the executive to gather congressional support so as to give an
indicator of public support to the airlift. This is an example of low or almost
nonexistent congressional participation.
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10. The Vandenberg Resolution - 1948
With the bold moves of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe the Western
governments were finding out that the original hopes they had for a peaceful, beneficial
postwar period were fading. For an answer to the Soviet moves, British Foreign
Secretary Ernest Bevin was one of the key figures in the formation and signing of a
treaty in Brussels early in 1948 which, in effect, stated the determination of Western
Europe to resist any external threat or aggression. America was not involved in the
treaty but on the day it was signed President Truman promised the support of the
United States.
At the same time in the U.S. Senate, several resolutions were being introduced
showing the need to strengthen the United Nations by changing its Charter so as to
reduce the veto power of the five principle nations. There wasn't as much interest in
creating new military alliances in the Senate as there was trying to change the United
Nations to make it more workable.
Secretary of State George Marshall and Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett
contacted the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Arthur
Vandenberg, to help the United States implement the Brussels treaty. Vandenberg, in
tum, proposed that the executive's interest in a military treaty be merged with the
various resolutions that asked for a change in the United Nation's Charter. The
Department of State worked on the several different resolutions and finally came up
with one version.
The Foreign Relations Committee backed up Vandenberg's version and soon
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which had been working on its own version,
set their version aside and adopted one similar to the Senate's. The resolution was
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passed. The real significance to this resolution was that it gave legitimation to the
origins of America's participation in the future development of the North Atlantic
Treaty.
To summarize, the agenda for thinking about this matter was set by the State
Department. Yes, there was recognition by the Senate in how to prepare for and fight
Soviet aggression but the initial presentation was by the executive. Also, Senator
Vandenberg's first reply to the State Department was to legitimate the Department's
position even though he tried to push through ideas which started in the Senate
regarding the United Nation's Charter revision.
This example once again illustrates the executive's dominance in the
identification and selection of problems which make up the foreign affairs agenda of
both Congress and the executive.
1 1. North Atlantic Treaty - 1948 to 1949
We have seen through the adoption of Senator Vandenberg's resolution the
participation of the United States in the development of the North Atlantic Treaty. This
treaty was essentially to provide for peace and security in the North Atlantic area
through the combined defense of several countries (Belgium, Britain, Canada,
Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
United States - three nations later joined, Greece, Turkey, and West Germany). The
treaty basically said that an attack on one of these nations would be considered an attack
on all and was an attempt to thwart more Soviet advances.
In the summer of 1948 the State Department started to work out a treaty with
representatives of different European nations. This time period was known as a
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"period of close cooperation between the State Department and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee."

..

To some extent in the summer and to a very much greater extent in December,
Undersecretary Robert Lovett and Senators Vandenberg and Connally worked
as a team. There were daily phone calls between Lovett and the Senators, and
between Frands Wilcox, Committee Chief of Staff, and Theodore Achilles,
Lovett's assistant in the pact negotiations. ... As Lovett testified later, 'when a
line was agreed on, and when it had the imprimatur of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, we could go back to work and know that we were going
to be backed up, and that is of tremendous importance in negotiation' (Bailey &
Samuel, 1952, p. 383).
There was a brief setback in progress when Truman was elected in 1949. This
meant that Senator Connally replaced Vandenberg as Chainnan of the Foreign
Relations Committee. Soon after, though, the Senate leaders and the State Department
were working closely again. This whole time period seemed to be one where Senate
leaders cooperated and met frequently with representatives from the State Department.
Even with such close cooperation the congressmen seemed to eventually occupy the
same position as with past experiences with the executive.
The communications during negotiation seemed to have been largely the
opportunity for the Senate leaders to be co-opted by the Department, that is, to
give legitimacy and support to the Departmental position. It would help, of
It
course, if one knew precisely what contribution the Committee made to the
substance of the treaty, but from the one detailed study of the case, it appears
that the role of legitimation was predominant over that of initiation (Robinson,
1967, p. 48).
12. Korean Decision - 1950
The decision to enter the Korean conflict was one of the bigger gambles in the
postwar era. It was a series of reactions to the invasion of South Korea by communist
North Korea. It was never a "declared" war. American and United Nations forces
fought for three years and ended with a divided nation cut off at the 38th parallel with
American forces still maintaining their presence today.
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What role did Congres.s play? On June 24th, 1950 President Truman decided
to send out the Seventh Naval Fleet to protect Formosa from being attacked and keep
Formosan forces from attacking mainland China. Simultaneously, Truman decided to
strengthen U.S. forces in the Philippines and to speed up military assistance to the
Philippines and aid the French in Indo-China (specifically Vietnam). After making
these decisions the President met with a few members of Congress at the White House.
This included Senate and House leaders and members of the Committees on Foreign
Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Armed Services. The meeting lasted about thirty
minutes and consisted of congressional members listening. It isn't clear if any
objections were raised about Congress not being notified earlier. So, congressional
leaders didn't play a part up to this point and didn't initiate any actions to participate to
a greater extent either.
After three more days the situation in Korea did not improve. Truman decided
to involve U.S. ground forces in Korea. On June 30th Truman and twenty-nine other
executive officials had a meeting with fifteen congressional leaders. The republican
floor leader, who was not at the first meeting with Truman, strongly objected to not
being informed before his decision to commit troops. Other congressional members
backed the President's decision.
Now, with historical hindsight, it is clear that Congres.s did not take part in the
decision to commit American troops in Korea. They were not asked to approve or
support the decision even though most of them did. They were not really told of the
decision in enough time to raise questions in order to influence the decision. The
congres.sional leaders who were called to the White House were the only ones who
were told at the same time as the press. The rest of Congress found out about it by
reading the newspapers.
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13. Japanese Peace Treaty - 1952
Under this treaty the United States has the right to maintain land, sea, and air
forces on Japanese soil and can use these forces without prior consultation with the
Japanese in order to keep the peace in the Far East.
The Senate actually had a double role in the making of this treaty. A
subcommittee on Far Eastern affairs (part of the Committee on Foreign Relations) took
part in formulating it and the full Committee and the Senate consented to the treaty.
This subcommittee was in contact with the U.S. ambassador to Japan frequently. The
ambassador was the main negotiator of the treaty for the United States. The
ambassador wanted to involve the subcommittee as a method of making it more likely
that the kind of treaty the Senate would accept would be the kind of treaty the
administration preferred and would accept with little public reaction.
The ambassador actually came to subcommittee meetings with ideas to discuss.
So, the Senators had a chance to be kept informed of progress in the negotiations and
to give their judgments about certain sections of the treaty. A point which stands out
about this example of congressional involvement in foreign policy is that the number of
people involved was increased substantially to include members of the Committee on
Foreign Relations and others.
By the executive branch enlarging those participating and giving them the
opportunity to advise as well as consent makes it possible to gain a treaty much more to
their liking.
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14. Bohlen Nomination - 1953
Soon after Dwight Eisenhower took office he appointed Charles Bohlen to be
the Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Mr. Bohlen was a Soviet specialist. He was
Franklin Roosevelt's interpreter at the Yalta conference in 1944. Unfortunately the
Yalta conference became a symbol among the Republicans for most all of the postwar
foreign policy errors by the Roosevelt and Truman Democratic administrations. Some
republicans objected to Eisenhower's choice of Bohlen as ambassador simply because
of his role as interpreter at Yalta. At his confirmation hearings Bohlen had an
opportunity to talk about Yalta. Instead of criticizing it he defended the conference.
This caused the Foreign Relations Committee to delay action on his nomination.
Meanwhile, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin died and Secretary of State John Dulles
tried to hurry the nomination along so Bohlen could be on hand to watch developments
more closely in Russia. It was still two weeks before the Committee reported the
nomination which allowed the Senate to consider the matter. Many believe an
opportunity was lost by not approving the nomination in time for Bohlen to leave for
the Soviet Union at the time of the Premier's death.
Even with Republican opposition, Bohlen's nomination passed with a vote of
74 to 13. The time taken to approve Bohlen was one month. An interesting thing to
note is that the Republican attention to the issue of Yalta brought back the problem of
party concerns to the President. Even though most republicans supported him, the
reluctance of their support might have reminded him that their are limits to his range of
discretion in foreign affairs.

15. Indo-China - 1954
In the early 1950's the French had occupied Indo-China for some time. By
1954 their position was decaying and their influence waning. Republican President
Eisenhower wanted to support the French by using U.S. air power. He empowered
his Secretary of State to try and gain the approval of congressional leaders for a joint
resolution allowing the use of air and naval power in Indo-China.
Eight congressmen met with five executive officials at the State Department.
They included; Senate Majority Leader William Knowland; Republican Conference
Committee Chairman Eugene Milikan; Speaker Joseph Martin; Senate Minority Leader
Lyndon B. Johnson and his Whip, Senator Earl Clements; Senator Richard B. Russell,
the ranking Democrat on the Committee on Armed Setvices; and House Democratic
Whip John McCormack and his assistant Percy Priest. The executive officials in
attendance were the Secretary of State, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, and the Assistant Secretary of State for
Congressional Relations.
The Secretary of State and the President's request for a joint resolution painted
a rather dim picture of Southeast Asia. They feared the eventual collapse of the French
forces in Indo-China unless American forces made an appearance. The Secretary felt
that iflndo-China fell, other Southeast Asia nations would also fall like a row of
dominoes. Senator Knowland at first approved the Secretary's request. At that time
Senator Clements asked if the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had the support of
his colleagues. The answer was that none of the other Chiefs approved. Senator
Johnson asked if American allies had been notified or consulted and was told that they
hadn't been. These answers were not satisfactory to congressional leaders and they
showed their hesitation to approve the executive's request.
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The meeting between these executive and legislative leaders ended in a little
over two hours. To sum up, the executive had asked for congressional approval to
commit U.S. armed forces to the war in lndo-China by a joint resolution. Congress's
questioning revealed holes in the executive's position and even Republican legislators
were against the Republican President's proposal. The executive action was vetoed.
In this instance Congress was fully consulted and was able to have more than a
substantial impact on a proposal initiated by the Executive.
16. Formosan Resolution - 1955
In the fall of 1954 the government of mainland China started bombing the city
of Quemoy, Formosa, and a follow-up invasion seemed a sure thing. The mainland
government stated their intention to "liberate" Formosa (Taiwan). Having already
established strong relations with Taiwan the United States became involved to the point
of being on the brink of war.
In 1955 the executive started a joint resolution which was passed by Congress
and which allowed the President to use force to keep the peace and protect Taiwan and
the surrounding islands. This resolution was proposed about the time Senator Walter
F. George became the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. George
was acknowledged as one of the most prominent Senators in his later years. It was his
chairmanship that helped the resolution get through Congress. His view of the role of
Congress in foreign policy was one of giving support and assistance for the State
Department.
On this resolution, Congress was notified ahead of time but were not brought
together as a group and asked if they would support this particular resolution. There
was some reluctance on the part of some members even thought the vote was 410-3 in
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the House and 85-3 in the Senate. "In this case Congress' role was hardly to be
consulted in advance bµt rather to be presented with a request for legitimation which it
could hardly deny" (Robinson, 1967, p. 54-55).
17. International Finance Corporation - 1956
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) began as part of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1956. Its purpose is to help private
investors in making loans for economic development. The IFC is difTerent from the
World Bank because it doesn't require a guarantee of repayment of the loan by whom it
was given to. The IFC was supposed to be an organiz.ation with the ability to create
private capital in international economic development (but in an easier fashion than the
World Bank). The idea of the IFC started in the United Nations and the World Bank.
For some time U.S. foreign policy makers opposed the creation of this type of affiliate.
The opposition came from the business and investment communities in the United
States.
The United States eventually came into agreement with the purposes of the IFC
and joined the membership list. The importance of this case with regard to U.S. foreign
policy is that Congress played a small role in the creation of American policy towards
the IFC. The idea of the affiliation came from outside the government and met
opposition from the business and investment communities. Any change in U.S. policy
regarding the nation's stance on the IFC were made with no connection to
congressional activity. Congress got involved only when they were pushed to
authorize membership in and appropriations for IFC. So, again, Congress simply
reacted to ideas and policies that started somewhere else and became a "legitimator."
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18. Foreign Aid - 1957
The focal point of Congress when it comes to foreign policy, at least in the
postwar period, is foreign aid. Requests for large amounts of foreign aid have been
thrown in the lap of Congress consistently since World War Two. The aid almost
always takes the form of military or economic aid. Once Congress has authorized such
aid they typically follow up with the appropriations process of actually coming up with
the money. This entire process takes the attention of congressmen for as long a time as
any other legislative issue.
Since this has been a recurring issue it may be advantageous to look at a single
case in order to grasp the role of Congress. The foreign aid bill in 1957 is an
interesting one to look at. It is not typical in relation to other foreign aid bills before or
after 195 7. It is one in which Congress had more than the usual amount of information
to work with. Since Congress was prepared with more information than usual it is
interesting to see how much initiative they took and how influential they were.
A special committee was established in 1956 to study foreign aid programs. It
included all the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the chairmen and
ranking minority members of the Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed
Services. The Committee contracted several nongovernmental agencies and groups
which dispersed ten well chosen individuals to travel through forty-four different
nations and report on the economic conditions and whether American aid might be
appropriate.
After they published their reports, hearings were held which lasted over two
months. The information contained in the reports had a large amount of solid facts,
opinions and recommendations about foreign economic assistance. At the time the
executive was simultaneously preparing their own research. Even though the Senate
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had gone to considerable lengths to gather much needed information on their own and
even though the Foreign Relations Committee finished a report that all of their members
signed, the initiative for coming up with a foreign aid bill was still with the executive.
It was still the President and his advisors who continued to "set the agenda" for any
deliberation of foreign assistance.
Concerning this 1957 aid bill, the executive's request included military aid,
economic assistance, defense support, technical assistance, and the many "extra"
programs that they threw together. It constituted more of an omnibus foreign aid
program. The amount requested, however, was more than Congress was willing to
grant. The executive wanted $4.4 billion dollars. The Senate authorized $4.2 billion.
The House authorized $3.7 billion. It went to a conference committee and the House
and Senate differences were split somewhere in the middle.
To sum up, it can be seen that the initiative for making the draft of the bill came
from the executive branch. It can also be seen that few original or meaningful
amendments came about through Congress. Also, the research conducted by the
special congressional committee ended up supporting or increasing the legitimacy of the
foreign aid program. Once again, the role of Congress was to legitimate the policy put
together by the executive. Congress was able only to "trim and reduce" that program.
19. Renewal of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act - 1958
The regulation of tariffs and trade was the most confrontational domestic and
foreign issue facing Congress for over one hundred years (middle 1800's and into the
20th century). By the 1930's the issue was so intense that many people started looking
for other alternatives for taking care of such issues. How intense was it? "In the
debate on the Tariff Act of 1930, which consumed more than six weeks in the Senate,

65
several legislators were struck ill or died as a result of the long and arduous task of
setting so many duties on so many items" (Robinson, 1967, p. 59).
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program was enacted by Congress in 1934.
This gave the President the power to raise or lower tariffs up to 50% of the existing
rates. It also included the category of "most favored nation" where countries with such
specification would receive the best trade concessions.
The program was renewed at different times until 1953 when the party in power
was the party which first opposed the Trade Agreements Program in 1934 (Eisenhower
administration). Further extensions were managed until 1955 when, in the House, a
motion from the Committee on Rules to consider the bill passed by only one vote. It
passed on the final vote by a slim margin of seven. When it came time to renew again
in 1958, an intense battle was expected.
Congressman Wilbur Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee put
strategic moves into play. When the bill was sent to Congress from the executive,
Mills saw it as very unfavorable and stated that only with time would the substance of
the bill improve. He saw that a long series of hearings were held in its passage.
Around the time the hearings were done, House leaders were in close
consultation with the executive leaders. The executive was helpful in coming up with
particular amendments and concessions which they thought would be acceptable to
other supporters of the bill. The legislative leaders tried to focus in on the individual
concessions that the executive didn't want to make.
The executive-legislative relations on bills like this are primarily those of close
allies working in behalf of the same program. The house leaders in particular
are the agents of the executive in getting through a program which the executive
has designed. The legislative leaders can tell the executive what kind of support
is available for the bill, but the making of alternatives to win over new votes is a
joint effort with legislators sometimes initiating what may be regarded as minor
concessions, and the executive, with its greater expertise, deciding whether
these are acceptable in the light of the whole program (Robinson, 1967, p. 61).
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20. Monroney Resolution - 1958
This was a Senate resolution that suggested the executive study the idea of
approaching other governments with the idea of creating an international development
association as an affiliate of the World Bank. It's purpose would be to give long-term
loans at low rates of interest to underdeveloped nations. Another purpose would be to
find a way to use huge amounts of foreign currencies owned by the United States
because of a surplus of farm sales overseas.
The resolution was brought into the Senate by Mike Monroney. The State
Department actively opposed it when first introduced. Monroney made certain
modifications so the odds of passing might improve. It was modified further in future
negotiations by the United States, the World Bank, and other governments. Monroney
readily accepted these modifications as necessary for getting the organiz.ation
established.
Later when the executive asked Congress to approve United States
membership, Monroney was not on the Foreign Relations Committee any longer. He
did, however, speak in behalf of the organiz.ation and continued his interest in seeing
the organization prosper. This was clearly a case of strong Congressional initiative
which might not have been successful if not for the persistence of Monroney.
21. Cuban Decision - 1961
In 1961 the United States supported an invasion of Cuba conducted by rebels.
The idea was originally conceived under the Eisenhower administration but was altered
and implemented under the Kennedy administration. In all the executive meetings that
took place the only congressional representative that was present was Senator William
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Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who made his opposition to
the invasion very obvious.
In April of 1961 the President met with the Secretaries of State, Defense,
Treasury, Director and Deputy Director of the CIA, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, the President's Special Consultant
• on Latin
• America, and the
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Fulbright was the only
participant who opposed the invasion.
Fulbright's eloquent and emotional speech impressed even the President and
many of those present thought the President might scrap the whole program. He
didn't. Later, in another meeting with Secretaries of State and Defense and the CIA
Director, the only change he made in his plans was not to involve U.S. troops.
So, only one congressional leader was consulted and even then at a late point in
the meetings and was only able to critique one alternative. He was not able to help
search for several alternatives. The invasion, as history has so well documented, was a
total disaster.
Each of these "cases" provides a nice little vignette of American foreign policy.
Where does it lead? The purpose is to demonstrate the involvement of the branches as
it relates to violent (or potentially violent) and non-violent cases. This can best be
illustrated in the tables which follow.
Table 1 demonstrates, in condensed fonn, which branch was involved, who
initiated involvement, and who dominated involvement in the 21 case studies just
presented. It also indicates if there was any legislation or resolution present or if
violence played a part.
A few interesting points may be seen from examining Table 2. For
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instance, notice the involvement of Congress in cases without the threat of violence
against cases where potential or actual violence is present. One can see Congress is
prone to be heavily involved in nonviolent cases. Table 2 summarizes this relationship.
Table 2 shows that in five of the six decisions in which Congress predominated
were nonviolent. The case of the request for force in Indo-China was the only one
where Congress was predominant in a potentially violent case.
By looking at Table 3 and the degree of influence, Congress is more likely to be
influential in nonviolent cases as opposed to violent or potentially violent cases.
"The implication of this for Congress' exclusive Constitutional authority to
declare war is obvious. In spite of its legal advantage, the actual locus of influence ...
(in the cases with potential violence) ... now resides with the executive" (Robinson,
1967, p. 68).
The definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power; the
antagonists can rarely agree on what the issues are because power is involved in the
definition. He who determines what politics is about runs the country because the
definition of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts
allocates power (Schattschneider, 1957, p. 937).
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Table 1
Congressional Involvement and Decision Characteristics
Congress
Involved?
l
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

high
high
low
high
high
low
high
high
none
high
high
none
high
high
high
high
low
high

19

high

20
21

high

Source:

low

Initiator
exec
exec
exec
cong
cong
exec
exec
exec
exec
exec
exec
exec
exec
exec
exec
exec
exec
exec
exec
cong
exec

Dominant
Influence
cong
exec
exec
cong
cong
exec
exec
exec
exec
cong
exec
exec
exec
exec
cong
exec
exec
exec
exec
cong
exec

Legislation
Resolution?
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no

Violence
at stake?
no
yes
no
no
no
yes
no
no
yes
no
no
yes
no
no
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
yes

Decision
Time
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
long
short
long
long
short
long
long
long
long
long
long

Robinson, J. (1967). Congress and foreign policy. Belmont, CA: Dorsey
Press. Reprinted by permission.
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Table 2
Congressional Involvement and Violence
Violence
No

Involvement

Yes

None ........................................................................... 2

2

Low ............................................................................ 2

2

High ......................................................................... 11

3

Source:

Robinson, J. (1967). Congress and foreign policy. Belmont, CA: Dorsey
Press. Reprinted by permission.

Table 3
Preponderant Influence and Violence
Violence
Influence

No

Yes

Executive ......................................................................6

10

Congress ...................................................................... I

5

Source:

Robinson, J. (1967). Congress and foreign policy. Belmont, CA: Dorsey
Press. Reprinted by permission.

CHAPTERV
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
AND EXECUTNE FUNDING
An often neglected way of looking at the executive-legislative balance in the
foreign policy arena is to examine the "modus-operandi" of conducting foreign affairs.

-

That is what this chapter will illustrate. Specifically, it will analyze the many
international agreements the U.S. makes with other nations. By doing so we can see
what form these agreements take, what their content has been, who has initiated them,
who has dominated their use and who has initiated "secret" agreements.

... discussed will be within the period 1946 to 1972 ( cold war to
The agreements
detente). It is within this period that America began their expanded role as a world
power with global influence and responsibilities. These responsibilities prompted more
formal relations with a greater number of nations.
The only explicit reference in the Constitution regarding international agreement
making is in Article Two, Section Two which states that the President "shall have
power, by and with the advice of the Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of
the Senators present concur." So, it is on the President's initiative that treaty making is
undertaken. So also, the final ratification of a treaty lies within the power of the
President and not, as commonly thought, the Senate. The President is the person who
puts out the official statement showing that the U.S. has considered a treaty and will
abide by it.
The President, however, doesn't
• have unlimited power to enter into treaties all
by himself. By a two-thirds concurrence the Senate was to intended to play a major
role. The executive branch, though, has managed to engage this nation in agreements
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without the concurrence the Senate, hence, the actual number of treaties ratified have
been few.
Under a claim of constitutional prerogatives, frequently ill-defined, the
executive branch has entered into many important international pacts merely
with the stroke of a pen in hidden executive offices, far from the halls of
Congress with its annoying habit of public debate (Johnson, 1984, p. 4).
The perfect example of this occurred during Franklin Roosevelt's administration when
he signed an agreement with Britain in 1940 to hand over fifty over-age destroyers in
return for a specific number of naval bases in the Caribbean. This was no small
agreement. It opened the door for war with Germany. The treaty process was
ignored. Many would say the end result was worth it, but it had the effect of chipping
away at the agreement-making procedure brought by the Constitution. This trade with
Britain established a precedent for future attempts at eliminating the Senate's influence.
From there it spread to "executive agreements" in areas from the military to economics
and communications.
Congressional criticism first directed itself to the form that these agreements
were taking. The legislature felt that the President was using too many executive
agreements, proclamations and other unilateral instruments to get around the Congress.
The problem is made worse by even more vague forms of executive agreements such
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as verbal promises and "understandings" between nations.
In Table 4 a line of "Executive Discretion" is given to show the spectrum of

....

international agreement making with the type of agreement in question.
As the next table (Table 5) shows, almost 87% of all United States agreements
between 1946 and 1972 have been statutory (instruments involving both houses of
Congress as well as the executive). Executive agreements which constitute an
agreement reached by the President which doesn't
• require the approval of Congress,
and treaties, represent only about seven or eight percent.
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Table4
International Agreement Making:
A Continuum of Executive Discretion
MORE===============EXECUTNE DISCRE TION===============LESS
B

A

C

D

.E

region of
executive authority

F

G

region of
institutional sharing

a. secret verbal executive agreements (understandings-promises)
b. secret written executive agreements (kept from Congress)
c. secret verbal or written agreements (shared with select congressional committees)
d. unclassified executive agreements
e. statutory agreements
f. agreements pursuant to treaties
g. treaties
S ource:

Johnson, L. (1984). The making of international agreements - Congress
confronts the executive. New York, NY: New York University Press,
Reprinted by permission.
With 87% of agreements involving both houses of Congress versus the7-8%

represented by executive agreements and treaties, it is clear that Congress is a
prominent player in the agreement making process.
The dominant pattern in this table shows that the statutory agreement has been
used most often. The executive agreement is second while the treaty is third. This
pattern held for fifteen years out of the twenty-seven represented by all the
administrations represented. The remaining years had the pattern of statutory
agreement, treaty and executive agreement. It is clearly evident that the statutory

74

Table 5
Form of U.S. Agreements by Administration, 1946-1972
Form

Administration
Truman

Eisenhower

Kennedy

Johnson

Nixon

Ave.

Executive
Agreements

10.6%

5.4%

3.8%

8.0%

9.1%

7.4%

Statutocy
Agreements

19.5%

89.2%

92.7%

86.7%

86.4%

86.7%

9.8%

5.4%

3.4%

5.2%

4.5%

6.0%

Treaties
Source:

Johnson, L. (1984). The making of international agreements - Congress
confronts the executive. New York, NY: New York University Press,
Reprinted by permission.

agreement has been used most often as a way of committing the United States to other
nations and so has effectively replaced the treaty as the official instrument of American
foreign policy commitment in the post World War Two era.
There doesn't appear to be any drastic differences between presidents in the use
of statutocy agreements. Evecy president (except Truman) used the statutocy agreement
over 86% of the time. The key point to be seen here is that this table conflicts with the
accepted argument that the executive agreement has replaced the treaty as the major tool
in conducting foreign policy. Rather, it appears that the statutocy agreement is the
dominant tool. We should be able to discover the reason for this discrepancy by
looking at the "content" of the agreements.
The period between World War Two and the Vietnam War represents more
active U.S. global involvement with other nations. This would include the attempt to
contain communism, rebuilding Europe and various other responsibilities as a world
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power. It represented a period of increasing interdependence between nations. The
dominant interest of the U.S. at the close of the war and for several years after was in
the area of economic policy and trade. About 37% of all agreements were in this area.
Later the Eisenhower era marked a tum toward more military defense pacts. The
overall number of pacts, however, were greater in the economic area in every
administration since World War Two with the exception of the Truman administration
who had more agreements in the 'cultural-technical' area. Together, the economic and
cultural-technical pacts made up almost 64% of America's international commitments
from 1946 to 1973. The military pact was third in frequency, making up about 19% of
the total. On the bottom of the frequency list were diplomatic issues such as
international boundary disputes and the establishment of diplomatic relations with other
nations along with transportation and communication issues.
To briefly summarize, it could be said the content of America's actions directed
at the rest of the world have been primarily economic in nature, followed closely by
cultural-technical and military agreements with a small stream of agreements having to
do with transportation, communications and diplomatic matters in last place.
The way the three major forms of agreements (treaties, executive and statutory
agreements) interact with the five "content" areas discussed in the above paragraphs is
interesting. This is represented in Table 6.
Upon looking at this table it becomes obvious that statutory agreements are
dominant here too. So, the argument that Congress has been consistently excluded
from specific policy areas fails again. Variances do occur in certain content areas
though. For example, executive agreements have been used most frequently for
military and diplomatic policy and less for economic, transportation-communication,
and cultural-technical policy.
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Table 6
Form of U.S. Foreign Agreements by Content Areas, 1946-1972
Content
Military

Econ.

Trans.
Comm.

Cultural
Technical

Diplomatic

Executive
Agreements

12.4%

4.6%

5.9%

3.7%

26.7%

Statutory
Agreements

84.0%

88.6%

84.6%

93.2%

60.0%

3.6%

6.8%

9.5%

3.2%

13.2%

Treaties
Source:

Johnson, L. (1984). The making of international agreements - Congress
confronts the executive. New York, NY: New York University Press,
Reprinted by permission.
An interesting way to contrast and compare legislative and executive patterns in

international agreement making is to look at each administration and how they used the
various forms and what their content was.
In each administration the statutory agreement was dominant in the process. It
rarely fell below 80% in any policy area. The exception to this came in the diplomatic
area where all presidents averaged just over 50%. Just two administrations, Truman's
and Johnson's, had statutory agreement levels below 80% in any other content area.
In regards to treaties, four of the administrations used them most often for
diplomatic commitments. In the other content areas the use of treaty varied with the
administration but what is interesting is how little it was used for military agreements.
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson had the lowest percentage of treaties and Truman
and Nixon had the second lowest. Military agreements appear to hardly ever take treaty
form.
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In complete contrast to this is the frequency of the use of executive agreements
in military and diplomatic policy by various administrations. All of the presidents,
except for Kennedy, used executive agreements much more for military and diplomatic
affairs than for any other policy areas.
Table 7 gives one an accurate conception of the balance between administrations
on the use of the executive agreement. It is called the Executive Agreement Index.
The index is based upon the proportion of executive agreements (EA) among
the total number of treaties (T) and executive agreements: EN(T+EA). This
table provides an indication of the degree of activism in foreign affairs for each
president. The use of treaties and executive agreements was compared, since
they have been more controversial than statutory agreements (Johnson, 1984,
p. 23-24).
While Nixon stands out as the one who made the most use of executive
agreements over treaties, an overall rise in the use of executive agreements is evident.
The resulting pattern is that presidents have relied more and more on the executive
agreement at the expense of the treaty in the international agreement process.
Summary
Two major themes can be seen upon reading the data presented. The first is
that the statutory agreement is extremely important as the primary formal instrument of
American commitments overseas along with the "accelerated" use of the executive
agreement. This is true despite the heavy use of the statutory agreement as an
important instrument for military and diplomatic commitments.
What the data suggest is that Congressmen have been asked by the Executive to
give, and have given, the "green light" to a majority of foreign commitments (most of
them begun by the executive branch). A different question is whether the Congress
knew exactly what it was approving. There have been studies too numerous to cite
here which argue that Congress is lacking in the "substantive" area (the meaningful
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Table 7
Executive Agreement Index (EAI), 1946-1972
Policy Area
Admin.

Militaty

Econ.

Trans.

Cultural

Diplomatic

Ave.

Truman

.67

.42

.25

.38

.72

.49

Eisenhower

.84

.12

.38

.55

.71

.52

Kennedy

.83

.27

.86

.67

.41

.52

Johnson

.83

.52

.26

.46

.71

.57

Nixon

.74

.77

.53

.66

.58

.66

Average

.79

.42

.46

.54

.63

a.)

This table summarizes the use ofmilitaty treaties and executive agreements only:
statutory agreements, which are more numerous but less controversial are not
analyzed here.

b.}

The numbers in each column represent for each administration the proportion of
executive agreements compared to the total number oftreaties and executive
agreements. The Executive Agreements Index ranges from O to 1: the higher the
index, the greater the reliance on executive agreements for the commitments
abroad.

details of policy) in spite ofits large procedural role in foreign commitments.
The second major theme to be seen in the data is that there bas been a
considerable amount of presidential discretion over specific, selected issues. Although
this discretion has been confined to militaty and diplomatic areas, one must remember
the commitment ofAmerican forces overseas are crucial facets of U.S. foreign policy.
One could easily surmise at this point that the Executive branch uses executive
agreements primarily for military purposes. One could also surmise that this coincides
with evidence given in Chapter IV in which the executive is dominant over Congress in
those foreign affairs events involving the use of force or the potential for violence.
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The Secret Side of Agreement Making
This "secret side" refers to executive agreements. As we know, these are the
agreements or commitments made by the executive branch with another nation with no
approval, and often no acknowledgement to, Congress. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, in a 1972 report, said "there have been numerous agreements contracted
with foreign governments in recent years, particularly agreements of a military nature,
which remain wholly unknown to Congress and to the people" (Senate Report No. 92591 ). Add diplomatic and intelligence obligations to those of a military nature and you
have a considerable number of secret agreements which can challenge the democratic
principles which America thrives on.
The focus here is on those agreements of a military nature. Previous chapters
have already discussed some of the bold actions Abraham Lincoln took during the Civil
War. He stretched the powers of Commander-in-Chief to new heights. More recently,
World War Two and the prolonged "cold war'' have changed the shape of foreign
policy. During this time our country looked to strong leadership to ward off an
external threat and this resulted in a significant shift of power to the presidency. One
need only look to the large number of international military commitments we've made
since the end of World War Two that were based on executive authority to find this
true.
For example, the executive branch has put military personnel in Guatemala,
Mainland China and Ethiopia, pledged military support to Turkey and Pakistan,
contracted for military bases in Spain, the Azores, the Philippines, Diego Garcia, and
Bahrain. One might conclude such agreements allowed the U.S. to negotiate from a
position of strength and, eventually, facilitate the downfall of the Soviet Union.
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Earlier, in Table 1, it was shown that only 7.4 % of all America's fonnal
commitments from 1946 to 1972 were based on executive agreements. Agreed, this is
a small percentage of the total, however, executive agreements have often been more
significant than treaties. The real question is: How often has Congress has been left
out of the decision-making process in crucial commitments overseas? This question
was touched on in Chapter IV, however, addressed here, only the executive agreement
and the treaty will be discussed (although used less than statutory agreements, they
have been more argumentative and controversial).
The so-called "conventional wisdom," at least in the opinion of Congress, has
taken the stance that the advice and consent of the Senate has been requested by the
executive branch mostly for things with little substance or meaning. Senator Dick
Clark oflowa in 1972 complained on the Senate floor that "The treaty fonn has been
used for a shrimp agreement with Brazil, an agreement on the conservation on polar
bears, and an agreement regarding the uninhabited coral reefs in the Caribbean." Other
treaties were concerned with such things as the recovery of lost archaeological objects
in Mexico, and increase in membership of the International Atomic Energy Board from
25 to 34 and the international classification of industrial designs.
The findings in Table 8, however, show that treaties have been used for
significant military agreements and not primarily for trivial matters.
Out of the 41 treaties signed from the Truman administration to the Nixon
administration 32 of them (78%) dealt with large military commitments. Some of them
included security arrangements with Japan, the Republic of Korea and certain countries
in Western Europe; major anns control agreements including the nuclear test ban treaty
of 1963 and post war peace treaties with fonner enemies (treaty of peace with Italy).
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The evidence for defense commitments overseas doesn't back up the "conventional
wisdom." Treaties have not actually disappeared from their usual traditional role.
Although 43 out of the 142 military executive agreements during this period had
to do with smaller routine and minor aspects such as reciprocal air rights with Canada
for rescue operations, many had involved large commitments abroad. Most of the
significant military commitments took the form of executive agreements.
Decisions involving the use of force, especially with U.S. troops, are of major
importance. Through analyzing the content of the main methods of conducting foreign
policy (treaties, executive agreements, statutory agreements) one can see the executive
branch attempting to circumvent congressional influence primarily through the use of
executive agreements. Even though the statutory agreement is persuasive and
Congress has participated extensively, it is not "seen" that way because many of the
crucial decisions, at least those involving potential violence, have been handled by the
executive. These crucial events are highly visible to the public and the world.
The basic conclusion here is that the executive branch has gradually increased
the use of executive agreements mostly in military commitments overseas to "take the
reins" in providing direction for overall American foreign policy.
Avoiding the Senate
Can it be proven that Presidents deliberately circumvent the Senate by using
executive agreements? Why would they want to? America's annexation of Texas and
Hawaii are two examples. In both it was doubtful whether a treaty would have
received the needed two-thirds vote for ratification by the Senate. Why? Often the
political party opposing the President occupies the Senate or all of capital hill. The
opposition to the President's policies then, theoretically, is strong.
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Table 8
The Dominance of Executive Agreements Over Treaties
in the Making of Significant Military Commitments
Abroad, 1946-1972
Significant
Military
Treaties

Significant

Military

Executive
Agreement
Index=

(T)

(EA)

EN(T+EA)

Truman

16

28

.64

Eisenhower

6

30

.83

Kennedy

1

4

.80

Johnson

5

24

.83

Nixon

4

13

.76

Total

32

99

Exec. Agree.

Administration

Source:

Johnson, L. (1984). The making of international agreements - Congress
confronts the executive. New York, NY: New York University Press,
Reprinted by permission.
It has been proven that Presidents will have only a slightly higher ratio of

executive agreements to treaties when the Senate is controlled by the opposition party
than they will when their own party controls the Senate (Margolis, 1986). How much
control (simple majority or a two-thirds vote) makes a difference. In a study by
Lawrence Margolis, our Presidents negotiated an average of 20.4 executive agreements
for each treaty when the majority of Senators were of his party. When Senators were
among the majority of the opposition party the President negotiated an average of 24
executive agreements. Although higher, it is not a major difference.
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Does it make any difference when the Senate is controlled by the opposition
party? Does it influence what types of agreements are made? No, it does not. When
the President's party made up a majority in the Senate (during the last eight
administrations) the following percentages of agreements and treaties were made;
50.7% procedural, 35.7% material goods, 13.5% military. When the Senate was
controlled by the opposition party the results are virtually the same; 50.3% procedural,
37.3% material goods, 12.3% military (Margolis, 1986).
A treaty, however, does not require a majority for passage. It needs a full two
thirds vote. If presidents really do use executive agreements more when they think that
Senate ratification will be difficult or impossible then the ratio of executive agreements
to treaties should be substantially lower when the President's party has a two-thirds or
more majority in the Senate. This hypothesis proved to be true (Margolis, 1986).
When the President's party had that two-thirds Senate majority he concluded an
average of 13.7 executive agreements for each treaty. When the President didn't have
that two-thirds majority he concluded an average of 24.4 executive agreements per
treaty. It can be said with some assurance that Presidents really do use executive
agreements to get around the Senate especially when the opposing party has a two
thirds majority.
Funding
It has been demonstrated how the President uses executive agreements to
circumvent the influence of the Senate in foreign affairs. Consistent use of the
executive agreement has partially nullified congressional influence on the actions of the
executive. The only other significant constitutional leverage Congress has in checking
the behavior of the executive is the "power of the purse."
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We should first recognize that there was early congressional deference to the•
executive represented by several acts of Congress. For example, when Congress first
created the Department of Foreign Affairs the secretary's duties involved carrying out
the directions of the president unlike the secretary of the Treasury who had to make
periodic reports to Congress. The Secretary of War was also made accountable to the
president.
When money was first appropriated for foreign affairs it was accepted that
certain sensitive information needed to be kept from Congress. The president could
have made his actions in sensitive foreign affairs and intelligence expenditures available
to Congress under an injunction of secrecy. A statute, however, provided "the
president shall account specifically for all such expenditures of the said money as in his
judgment may be made public, and also for the amount of such expenditures as he may
think it advisable to specify" (Turner, 1991, p. 72).
The regular method of appropriating funds in the first fifteen years under the
new Constitution was well described in a letter from Thomas Jefferson to Treasury
Secretary Albert Gallatin in 1804:
The Constitution has made the Executive the organ for managing our
intercourse with foreign nations ... the Executive being thus charged with the
foreign intercourse, no law has undertaken to prescribe its duties ... It has been
the uniform opinion and practice that the whole foreign fund was placed by the
Legislature on the footing of a contingent fund, in which they undertake no
specifications, but leave the whole to the discretion of the president (The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 6).
We could safely say that the "whole" is definitely not left to the president today.
If, however, the executive has come to dominate specific key or crucial events, in ways
sometimes contrary to the wishes of Congress, how have they obtained the money
needed when Congress is supposed to control the purse strings? Is there something
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about the funding methods which has allowed or even aided the executive in
completing their foreign policy objectives?
The phenomenon of the executive attempting to spend funds in ways not
earmarked for spending when the original appropriations went through Congress have
become more commonplace with the beginning of the institutional presidency in which
more executive agencies came into existence. The number of both domestic and
foreign commitments rose dramatically. The number of appropriation bills Congress
dealt with increased substantially. There seemed to be increasing instances of the
President funding activities even when Congress never authorized or appropriated such
funds. Also, many of these instances were cases where the completion of the objective
was not at all vital to the national interest. How does the executive locate the funds?
One way is to make transfers between accounts. This happens when agency
officials take money away from one appropriation account and put it in another. But is
that legal? The current law states "sums appropriated for the various branches of
expenditures in the public service shall be applied solely to the objects for which they
are respectively made, and for no others" (Fisher, 1975, p. 104). Even so, in 1970,
Richard Nixon said he was putting U.S. forces in Cambodia to destroy communist
sanctuaries near the border of South Vietnam. This was financed initially by the
transfer of funds from foreign assistance accounts. After invading Cambodia, Nixon
requested $255 million from Congress for military and economic assistance to South
Vietnam. One hundred million of those dollars was used to restore funds that the
president had already diverted to Cambodia from other programs (Fisher, 1975).
Nixon was able to get the $100 million because:
Section 610 of the Foreign Assistance Act allowed him to transfer up to 10
percent of the funds from one program to another. ... Furthermore, Section
614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act gave the President additional authority to
spend funds for mutual security whenever he found it 'important to the security

of the United States'. Also, Section 506 gave the President a $300 million
emergency fund for military aid ... Nixon borrowed $40 million from aid
programs originally scheduled for Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, and the Philippines
•
... and diverted still other amounts until a total of $108.9 million in military
•
assistance had been given, or committed, to Cambodia (Fisher, 1975, p. 107).

..

-

Another method of getting the necessary funds is reprogramming. This
consists of the shifting of funds within an appropriations account from one program to
another. Reprogramming is done differently depending on the committee. The only
thing usually required is an informal clearance by four men: subcommittee chairmen of
the House and Senate Appropriations committees and authorizing committees.
Sometimes it is handled at the staff level by subcommittee clerks (Ingram, 1972).
There is also "covert" financing or "confidential" funding. An authorized
official signs a certificate which becomes a sufficient voucher. It then needs no further
auditing (Fisher, 1977). One way of creating confidential funds is authoriz.ation in
legislation followed by funding in an appropriation act. Authoriz.ation is a legislative
action that establishes a program, specifies its putp0se and the means for achieving it,

..

and indicates the approximate amount of money needed to implement the program. An
appropriation comes after the authoriz.ation and is the actual granting of money.
Another way of producing confidential funds is by creating authoriz.ation
legislation without specific sums being appropriated for that purpose. The funds then
taken from monies regularly appropriated each year, a portion of which may be spent
for confidential purposes. Foreign assistance is occasionally done in this way.
Political scientist Louis Fisher cites an estimate that in the 1972 fiscal budget of
$249 billion, secret funds may amount to $15 billion to $20 billion ... the only
item in the budget clearly marked as military aid totals around $400 million.
That is a gross understatement. At Joint Economic Committee hearings last
January, Senator William Fulbright introduced a table showing more than $6.9
billion in military assistance and sales for fiscal 1972. Two Defense
,. with each other over the
Department officials broke pencils while disagreeing
total cost, finally putting the figure at $4.9 billion and later revising it to $6.3
billion (Ingram, 1972, p. 40).

...
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There are other ways the executive can locate the necessary funds for their
objectives. There is the use of military stocks. The Washington Monthly. 1972,
estimated that the amount of obsolete weapons and supplies available to the Defense
Department for military aid alone amounted to over $9 billion. "Since there are no
guidelines, a fairly new weapons system can be declared 'excess' and then shipped off
to any nation that the Defense Department deems needy" (Margolis, 1986, p. 72-73).
Another method of getting funds is using unexpended funds. These are funds
that haven't received authorization or appropriation from Congress. The amount
available in this area is enormous and carries over each year. Here, the concept of "full
funding" comes into play. The majority of appropriations are for one year only and the
amounts not spent are supposed to be returned to the Treasury. Often on large projects
such as building a navy vessel, Congress appropriates one large sum that carries over
for a specific time until spent. This frees Congress from appropriating an amount each
year and also allows them to know how much the project will cost. The drawback is
that if the project is cancelled or comes in under budget, the remaining funds are not
returned to the Treasury. So, having accumulated extra funds in the "pipeline," the
military is careful to always have something in reserve.
The two most important things to remember are first, that Congress' control
over the purse strings has been weakened )>y the funding methods just discussed and
secondly, that for the most part, Congress has either created, or at least consented to,
these methods. Congress could easily place a great deal of the blame on themselves for
the problem, if it actually is a problem.
Congress actually creates secret and covert funding. It is no secret to them.
Congress never at any time set strict guidelines to indicate when military equipment
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becomes "obsolete." The Pentagon can then simply declare an almost new system
"obsolete."
Congresspeople are not stupid ... they may have been either lax in their
oversight duties or naive in their belief that the executive branch would not take
advantage of the discretion that was granted to it. However, they may well
have been guilty of neither of these charges. They may well have created this
situation because they wanted it to work out the way it has (Margolis, 1986, p.
76).

CHAPTER VI
STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES WITHIN CONGRESS REGARDING
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ATTEMPT TO STRENGTHEN
INFLUENCE DURING THE 1970'S
Even though Congres.s has played an active role in foreign affairs (most often
following a war) it does not mean Congres.s is adequately equipped to effectively
handle serious foreign policy matters. There are several factors that can account for
this inability. One factor is "parochialism."
Parochialism
This concept implies that members of Congress are drawn more to domestic
matters rather than foreign affairs. Members are up for reelection every two years.
This tends to pressure congressmen into focusing on domestic interests. Hence,
members have a narrow constituency range unlike the President who has a national
constituency.
Because most members need to satisfy local concerns within their constituency
they tend to see the world in the same way. Former Senator and chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Fulbright, said
With their excessively parochial orientation, members are acutely sensitive to
the influence of private pressure and to the exces.ses and inadequacies of a
public opinion that is all too often ignorant of the needs, the dangers, and the
opportunities in our foreign relations (Lehman, 1976, p. 43).
It is all too easy for a specific foreign policy problem to be looked at from the Irish,
African or Israeli viewpoint. Recently there has been a push for mandated term limits
which may or may not change the "parochial" view.
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The President has a much broader outlook and can probably afford to alienate
certain local or narrow interests. The President can and does think more in terms ofthe
"long run". A member ofCongress cannot do this. This "local focus" usually means
any attention given to foreign affairs will be short and the newsworthiness will
determine just how short (Crabb & Holt, 1980).
Many members are anxious to seive on specific committees as a method of
enhancing their chances ofwinning reelection. Most strive for a position on a
committee which best seives his or her local constituency. Again, mandated term limits
could have an affect here.
A difference in policy process should be noted here. Executive branch policy
debates usually happen in private, with the President and one or two other individuals
making any final choices. Congressional debates, however, are usually public with
any final choices decided by votes ofthe various members ofa committee or
committees. The center ofdecision making is more fragmented and widespread.
Organizational Weakness
At the opening ofthe 1970's Congress adopted numerous reforms that tended
to decentralize power from the committee to the subcommittee level. Younger members
challenged the seniority system. This, plus a number ofother reforms reduced the
importance ofleadership positions such as committee chairman. The ultimate result
was that it was now harder to find where, specifically, power and influence were in
Congress. The "leadership" therefore, finds it harder to speak for Congress as a
whole. Congressmen who are not usually associated with foreign policy issues are
now able to take the initiative in defining issues and setting agendas. Many ofthe
congressional attempts to restrict executive prerogative during the early 1970's were
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started by members who were normally outside the congressional foreign policy
"establishment" (Franck & Weisband, 1979).
Single issue politics has added to the problem of diffusion of power within
Congress. Members typically are evaluated only on their performance (voting record)
on specific issues and not on the basis of their overall record.
The diffusion of power and sharing of responsibility within Congress means
that no one is capable of speaking for the whole institution, which complicates
and frustrates efforts at legislative-executive consultation and coordination. It
also leads to the charge that Congress is irresponsible" (Kegley & Wittkoph,
1982, p. 407).
Another method Congress uses which promotes individual unaccountability is
the habit of dealing with issues in procedural terms instead of taking them head-on.
For example, when the Senate was analyzing and deciding on two versions of a
Panama Canal treaty, they offered 145 amendments, 26 reservations, 18
"understandings" and 3 declarations. It totaled up at 192 changes (Crabb & Holt,
1980).
It was common during the Panama Canal case to call most of the changes
"improvements". That made it easier to vote for a "politically unpopular document."
Put another way, "procedure" develops into an effective method for dealing with
single-issue politics
Because congressmen are able to mask the real effects of their votes and thereby
deflect potential electoral criticism. They can also avoid direct confrontation
with the executive by couching their opposition in procedural arguments to
which the executive branch has no retort (Kegley & Wittkoph, 1982, p. 407).
Procedure, it seems, is used to avoid direct responsibility.
Because Congress is more "open" to the public members are sometimes prone
to "leak" information. Leaking is related to something senators and representatives
hold dear; their independence. It follows that some will take advantage of opportunities
that put them in the mass media's spotlight.
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Another area where Congress is weak, although through no fault of their own,
is in the slow, meandering legislative process itself. Congress must find agreement
among many disparate views and this often requires slow deliberative methods. The
diffusion of power and responsibility between the two chambers, the intricate structure
of the committee system along with the decay or even disappearance of "party
discipline" only exacerbates the problem.
Rarely does anything happen quickly in Congress. On the way to reaching
consensus, policies may be compromised to the point of ineffectiveness (Sundquist,
1976). Now, think of the President's track record of being able to act quickly and
decisively in a world of constantly changing events which often require secrecy and
immediate responses. A President can delay or act indecisively too but Congress is
forced to simply because of their institutional structure.
Inability to Control the Flow oflnformation
The President is known to have more extensive control of information and
technical expertise available to him. Congress doesn't have the huge capabilities for
gathering information that numerous branches of the executive has. Congress still
depends on the executive for much information. Because of this Congress tends to
react to the executive taking the initiative as was illustrated in Chapter N.
Congress has tried to improve their situation. They have enlarged the operation
of the General Accounting Office in order to deal with the executive more effectively.
They created the Office of Technology Assessment and the Congressional Budget
Office. More importantly, Congress has increased the size of their staff - both
committee and individual staff.
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A larger staff provides Congress the means to assert its own independent
position in relation to the executive branch with regard to major international questions.
It also supplies national legislators with a new incentive to become active in a field
where, during an earlier period, they often had neither the interest nor the expertise to
become deeply involved (Crabb & Holt, 1980, p. 192).
Has a larger staff helped Congress to handle complex foreign policy issues?
That is uncertain. More information is within their control but that doesn't mean that
better policy is the result. Congress has often been leery of information it has received
from the executive and now they must be wary of information it receives from its own
staff which may be produced to further some special interest.
The director for the Carnegie Endowment's project on executive-legislative
relations stated "Institutional decentralization, policy conviction, and ample staffing
encourage legislators to become involved in the detail of policy. This not only takes
away executive flexibility, but also adds new uncertainty because no one can predict
what Congress will ultimately do" (Destler, 1981, p. 103).
Even though many individual members are experts in certain areas not all
members can be experts on all matters of policy. The executive, however, can be and
is. More importantly, members are poorly suited in acquiring specific types of
information that would help them to better monitor and have an effect on decision
making when crises occur.
Alexander Hamilton knew that the size and cumbersome ways of Congress
would have a detrimental effect on foreign policy if congressional influence was too
strong. Hamilton emphasized the wisdom of creating a "vigorous executive" who
would act without the need to obtain approval of even an executive council. In the
Federalist Papers, No. 70, he wrote:
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Energy in the executive is a leading characteristic in the definition of good
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign
,.
attacks . ... That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision,
activity, secrecy and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one
man in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater
number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be
diminished. This unity may be destroyed in two ways; either by vesting the
power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by vesting
it ostensibly in one man, subject in whole or in part to the control and
cooperation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. ... In the legislature
promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of
opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government,
though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote
deliberation and circumspection; and serve to check excesses in the majority.
When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That
resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favourable
.,.
circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages
of dissension in the
executive department. Here they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at
which they
• cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the
execution of the plan or measure, to which• they
• relate, from the first step to the
final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the
executive which the most necessary ingredients
• in its composition, vigour and
... good. In the conduct of war,
expedition, and this without any counterbalancing
in which the energy of the executive is the bulwark of the national security,
every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality (Federalist Papers,
no. 70, pp. 471-73, 475-76, Alexander Hamilton).

-.
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Yes, structural weaknesses are present. This was not a condition, however,

-

which prevented Congress from attempts to strengthen their influence
" on foreign affairs
particularly during the 1970's.
Congressional Pressure on the Executive:
Legislative Surges of the 1970's
This chapter will continue to examine the historical executive-legislative conflict
which continues today; division over who controls the war powers.
During the 1970's Congress had begun to actively enact legislation designed to
bring an end to U.S. involvement in Indo-China. Congress believed to be acting in
accordance with the people since public opposition to the war had begun to rise or at
least had become more visible.
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In 1971 the Cooper-Church amendment attempted to end all funding for
American troops, advisors or air support in Cambodia (after Nixon's journey into that
country to attack North Vietnamese supply lines). The amendment failed. It did,

... for Congress.
however, set the stage for further legislative initiatives
The picture of the Johnson and Nixon administrations carrying on military
activities in indo-china without congressional consent often has been overdrawn
by critics of the war. They tended to overlook the frequent votes in Congress
for appropriations to support the war. And while they often spoke of a
constitutional crisis over war powers, they usually did not consider that
throughout the war there was never a constitutional confrontation between a
President determined to pursue the war and a Congress unwilling to appropriate
the necessary funds (Kegley & Wittkoph, 1982, p. 426-427).
Another similar amendment, the McGovern-Hatfield amendment, attempted to

.

set deadlines for U.S. withdrawal from lndo-China. Later, in 1973, the Eagleton

. . a total withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia. Both amendments
amendment demanded
failed but the developing pattern of congressional assertion was obvious.
The Fulbright amendment, as an amendment to the Second Supplemental

Appropriations Act of 1973, prohibited the use of funds that directly or indirectly
supported combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South
Vietnam.
Regarding the sale of defense material to other nations, the 1974 Foreign
Assistance Act required the President to give advance
• notice to Congress of any offer to
sell defense equipment or services to foreign nations when such equipment or service

..

had a price tag of $25 million or more. It gave Congress the authority to disapprove
these sales.
The Nelson-Bingham amendments to the Arms Export Act further affected the
President's freedom of action in building bilateral relationships with foreign nations by
adding more restrictions including advance notice to Congress of"major'' defense
equipment that totaled over $7 million. The result of these laws is that for several years
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high profile, national level debate has accompanied every major arms sale, which has
been way out of proportion to the sale or transaction in question.
Congressional assertion went beyond the conflict in Indo-China. In July of
1974 the executive branch became involved in negotiating a settlement between two of
our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey (over occupation of the island of Cyprus). After
displays of violence, a cease-fire was reached with Turkey controlling 25% of the
island of Cyprus. Congress, however, was following its own road. The House of
Representatives brought out two measures demanding the withdrawal of Turkish
troops from Cyprus. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee started a State
Department inquiry into possible Turkish violations of U.S. arms restrictions. In
trying to avert a Turkish arms embargo, the White House brought in several Senators
to attend briefings on the possibility of negotiations. "Even after being shown evidence
that a negotiation likely to improve Greece's position was in the making, these
congressmen continued to call for an arms embargo; soon all hope for a negotiated
settlement vanished'' (Tower, 1981, p. 236).
Later, the Turkish government of Prime Minister Ecevit collapsed and a day
later Congress began a Turkish arms embargo. By then Turkey controlled 40% of
Cyprus. Turkey responded to the embargo by putting all American military bases on
provisional status. After the White House rejected a motion to lift the embargo, Turkey
stated it was shutting down all American bases on its territory.
Instead of reaching an agreement with a moderate Turkish government that
controlled one-quarter of Cyprus, the United States had severely strained
relations with an angry Turkish government that controlled two fifths of the
island. Furthermore, the aid cut off weakened Turkey militarily, jeopardizing
the southern flank of NATO and putting at risk our strategic listening posts in
that country (Tower, 1981, p. 236).
Other areas in which Congress was developing influence was in aid to third
world nations. The Tunney Amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act of 1976
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stopped the use of any funds for any activities involving Angola other than intelligence
gathering.
This was followed by the Clark Amendment to the Arms Export Act of 197 6
which continued to restrict involvement in Angola by prohibiting any kind of aid.
Many believed any U.S. involvement would bring about "another Vietnam". The
debate over involvement in Angola sent a straight forward message to the Soviets and
their Cuban proxies - that America was unwilling to get involved in foreign
entanglements. When the Tunney Amendment passed, the Soviets knew the risk of
U.S. intervention was low. The number of Cuban troops doubled in preparation for
what would become a full fledged offensive against pro-western forces.
This event marks a unique change. This was the first time the Soviet Union or
any of its proxies attempted such large scale operations in Africa or any other third
world nation. It gave them an improved image of being dependable allies and
supporters of various political movements in Southern Africa. America, on the other
hand, was seen as having lost some nerve for foreign involvement after Vietnam and as
being divided domestically over a foreign policy strategy.
Congress continued to expand their influence in other areas. Two of the more
aggressive congressional interventions into national security policy were the Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, primarily the CIA, and the Hughs-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act. The former was also known as the "Church Committee." Even the
Vice-Chairman of the Church Committee, Senator John Tower, admitted that by
operating a public inquiry concerning the CIA, we not only exposed alleged mistakes
or blunders, we also exposed vital information on how the CIA is organized, what
kinds of sources it makes use of and generally how it gathers intelligence.
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In 1974 the Hughs-Ryan Amendment became law and prevented the CIA from
engaging in any activities overseas that was not directly related to intelligence gathering
"unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the
national security of the United States and reports, in timely fashion, a description and
scope of such operations to the appropriate committees of Congress" (Tower, 1981, p.
127).
Only several years later information on covert intelligence activities was
accessible by eight congressional committees, totaling up to 200 members, or
approximately 40% of Congress. In October of 1980 the President signed into law an
amendment to the National Security Act which reduced the number of committees to
two. This was one of the rare reversals of the legislative onslaught of Congress in the
early 1970's.
This intrusion into intelligence activities, however, once again sent a message to
other nations, particularly our adversaries, that secret operations would be significantly
limited in the future. It upset the confidence of the friendly states who had helped us in
gathering intelligence and made them reevaluate their relationship with the American
intelligence community (Tower, 1981). They believed congressional investigations
might reveal their own intelligence sources and methods.
Thus far numerous legislative acts have been discussed regarding Congress'
attempt to increase its influence on foreign affairs. We will now examine the one act
which is considered to be the most constitutionally questionable and the best example
of executive-legislative conflict; the War Powers Resolution of 1973.

CHAPTER VII
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THEWAR
POWERS ACT OF 1973
The most far reaching of congressional attempts to curb the executive is the War
Powers Act of 1973. This Act represents the epitome of the age-old problem of
interpreting what branch holds what power regarding the use of U.S. forces abroad.
As such, it serves as one of the best examples of current legislative-executive conflict.
The Act contains ten different sections, however, only those sections that raise
constitutional problems will be examined here.
Section 2(c) attempts to limit "the constitutional powers of the president as
Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances" to three circumstances: (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States,
its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

-

The language here would seem to try to have the effect of law. If so, it is a
definite encroachment upon the independent constitutional
power of the president.
Senator Jacob Javits acknowledged this when he stated that the statute was improper
because of its failure to recognize the president's power to rescue Americans in danger
abroad or on the high seas.
Under the Constitution, as long as Congress provides the Commander-in-Chief
with an army or navy it is his to deploy and utilize as he deems necessary with
the single exception that if he concludes it is necessary to initiate offensive war
against another state, he must first obtain the statutory approval of both houses
of Congress" (Turner, 1991, p. 110).
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Section 3 of the Act demands that the president consult with Congress
whenever possible prior to committing armed forces "into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances."
Certainly the president should keep Congress informed about major foreign policy
decisions at least for political reasons. Remember, this is done with the idea of
preserving operational security and maintaining safety of the main forces and other
personnel.
This "consultation" should happen between co-equal branches of the
government. It should be done out of mutual self interest. It is not something that one
branch "compels" another branch to perform. It is well known that in constitutional
law Congress cannot force the president to supply sensitive national security material
that in his estimation should be held within the executive branch.
This section compels the president, a co-equal representative of the population,
to consult Congress about sensitive issues specifically under his direction. Further, the
section doesn't specify with "whom" the president is supposed to consult. Does this
mean individual consultations with 535 members of the legislature or maybe just a
phone call or two to a few committee chairmen?
Most everyone would not deny the importance of the president keeping
Congress informed. It could negatively affect his policy efforts over the long run if he
did not. On grounds of policy not many people would oppose the consultation sections
of the War Powers Resolution but as an exercise in the lawmaking authority of
Congress it definitely raises problems. When a request to consult becomes a directive
in the form of a statute forcing the president to reply, it gives the president great
incentive not to cooperate. In the end it should be quite clear that Congress cannot
change the constitutional separation of powers by statute alone.
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Section 4 deals with the "reporting" requirements. If war hasn't been declared,
Congress demands detailed reports to be handed in within forty-eight hours of
whenever U.S. forces are placed into "hostilities." This congressional demand forces
the president to supply details dealing with the scope and length of military operations.
Congress then treats the information as a "legally binding commitment" which forces
the executive "to accept precisely the sort of artificial constraints in advance of rapidly
changing situations that (John) Locke and his contemporaries recognized were
incompatible with the effective conduct of military operations" (Turner, 1991, p. 112).
If Congress accepted that these reports were good faith estimates that may need
to be departed from by the president when conditions forced him to, then the only
critical risks would be leakage of information that might jeopardize the safety of
American lives or give advantage to adversaries. Congress, however, doesn't see it
that way. Most will view it strictly. When the president departs from any game plan
given to Congress he will be quickly accused of lying or breaking the law.
Section S(b) represents the most unconstitutional parts of the Resolution. It
states the president must withdraw forces from any situation where "imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances" (p. 4) if Congress
has not acted to authorize the ongoing presence of military forces within 62 days of
initial involvement. An additional 30 days may be approved by Congress if it is agreed
that the safety of the forces involved requires it. This is required even if a single shot
has not been fired and American forces are only in a defensive setting (being in harm's
way just by virtue of possible foreign aggression).
This section seems to be nothing less than a direct congressional etfort to limit
the powers of the Commander-in-Chief vested in him by the Constitution. The
Constitution is clear on this point. We know the president must have approval of both
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houses of Congress in advance of initiating a conflict (if the president believes starting
a war with another state would serve national interests). Like all other exceptions to the
president's powers, the power to declare war was intended to be viewed narrowly. It
allows Congress to stop a presidential action to start an offensive action, however, it
does not give Congress power to take control of the president's independent
constitutional powers simply on the idea that any executive mistakes might bring
another state to begin aggression against the United States.
It might be true that a president could utilize his powers as Commander-in
Chief in a way that would increase the chances of involvement in war, however, our
experience with the Neutrality Acts of the 1930's (mentioned in Chapter N) shows the
prospects of war from aggressor nations may increase when the president's hands are
tied. The Clark Amendment of 197 5 prevented the president from helping the non
communist majority in Angola to fight Soviet and Cuban combat troops being brought
to Angola and other areas of Africa. A later "enlightened" Congress repealed this.
One should also consider what kind of message this section of the Resolution
sends to the world. Consider a country that wishes to align itself with America in
deterring international aggression. They are informed that the president's powers as
Commander-in-Chief are only good for two or three months. Beyond that, a huge
unorganized legislature is in command.
To make the situation even more alarming, the War Powers Resolution tells
America's friends (and its enemies) that Congress has determined in advance
that, in the event it cannot make up its mind whether the president is right or
wrong it will assume as a matter of law that the president is wrong . ... Through
section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, Congress has effectively sent a
message around the world that it has delegated broad legal authority to any anti
U.S. foreign radical who can aim a rifle or toss a genade at a U.S. soldier to set
the war powers clock in motion ... with luck, killing a few Americans might
actually start the war powers clock and result in the withdrawal of all U.S.
military forces from the region. The larger question is whether U.S. voters are
going to tolerate such behavior once they realize that their elected
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representatives have placed a bounty upon the lives of their sons and daughters
serving in uniform abroad (Turner, 1991, p. 114-115).
This view was supported by Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee during a statement on the floor of the Senate on May 18, 1988;
"The 60 day clock, when it begins ticking, gives foreign governments and adversaries
who perhaps are not governments, including terrorist groups, a real lever for
influencing the U.S. policy debate ... in short it means the jerks can jerk us around,
and they do" (Congressional Record, 100th Congress, 2nd session, p. 6175).
Excerpts from section 5(c) of the Resolution are presented below. It is
followed by a direct quote from Article One, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution. It is
not complex language. See if you can discern any discrepancies.
Section 5(c) War Powers Resolution of 1973:
Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that the United States Armed
Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its
possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory
authoriz.ation, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so
directs by concurrent resolution.
United States Constitution, Article One, Section 7:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall
be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
A concurrent resolution needs the approval of both chambers of Congress
(majority vote) but does not require the president's signature. Its origins go as far back
as Franklin Roosevelt's administration in the 1930's. Since 1932 when the first veto
provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures have been
attached to 196 various statutes. Five statutes were affected from 1932 to 1939;
nineteen statutes from 1940 to 1949; thirty-four statutes from 1950 to 1959; and one
hundred and sixty-three statutes from 1970 to 1975.
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The most important use of the resolution is as a "legislative veto" over the
president's exercise of powers delegated to him by Congress (not necessarily the
Constitution). A legislative veto sometimes includes disapproval by Congress of
specific "reorganization plans or congressional opinion regarding fixing the date for
adjournment, creating joint committees and welcoming foreign visitors to the U.S."
(Plano & Greenberg, 1972, p. 157).
It is not, however, a constitutional method of controlling the direction of the
executive branch. If you thought this "legislative veto" to be valid, you would have to
also think Congress could amend the Constitution by concurrent resolution because
decisions on the deployment of troops by the president is a power vested in him by the
Constitution.
Implementation of the Resolution
How many times since the resolution's passage have there been situations
where Congress might have invoked the Act? The following paragraphs contain
incidents of U.S. foreign affairs, related to the War Powers Act, which show how
presidential-congressional relations have evolved since the Act's passage. Some
examples will be elaborated on further following this initial listing.
1. President Nixon failed to submit a report after he ordered an evacuation of
forces during hostilities on the island of Cyprus in July of 1974.
2. The first report since the Act's passage was filed by Gerald Ford in 197 5
after he ordered Marine forces, Navy vessels and helicopters to carry refugees in South
Vietnam.
3. Ford, after ordering the same forces to aid the evacuation of Americans in
Cambodia submitted a second report also in 1975.
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4. Ford also filed a third report after using Navy helicopters, Marine and Air
Force fighters to bring out U.S. citizens and foreign nationals trapped in South
Vietnam (1975).

5. Ford again filed his fourth report following the introduction of U.S. forces
to rescue the crew of the Mayaquez (U.S. boat seized by Cambodian communists).
Notification of Congress came after actions had been ordered.
6. In June of 1976, the Navy evacuated 263 Americans and Europeans from
Lebanon during that country's civil war. President Ford did not file a report regarding
the landing craft used.
7. Additional military forces were brought into Korea after two U.S. Army
servicemen were killed by North Korean soldiers in the demilitarized zone in August of
1976. Asked why he didn't file a report, President Ford answered by stating that
Section Four A (3) the "substantial enlargement" provision did not apply to the
addition of a "relative handful" of personnel. U.S. troops in Korea already numbered
41,000.
8. President Carter had U.S. military aircraft aid the Belgians and French
rescue foreign nationals in jeopardy from the civil war in Zaire. No report was filed.
9. President Carter ordered U.S. Air Force helicopters and six other aircraft to
rescue American hostages in Iran in April of 1980. Carter filed his first and only report
regarding this action.
10. President Reagan in March of 1981, sent 20 military advisors to El
Salvador to help other advisors already sent by President Carter. No report was
submitted. Congressmen Richard Ottinger introduced a concurrent resolution stating
that report was necessary. Reagan answered by saying that pertinent sections of the
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Act did not apply because the personnel were not being introduced into hostilities and
were not equipped for combat.
11. On August 19, 1981, two U.S. Navy fighters ordered into the Gulf of
Sidra, were fired upon by two Libyan jets. The U.S. fighters returned fire and
destroyed the Libyan aircraft. Reagan didn't file a report about placing the jets in the
GulfofSidra on the grounds that "imminent involvement in hostilities [ was not] clearly
indicated by the circumstances".
12. Reagan's first report was filed in March of1982 after he ordered U.S.
military personnel into the Sinai to help expedite the peace treaty between Israel and
Egypt.
13. Reagan's second report followed the placement of800 marines to aid the
withdrawal ofPalestinian armed forces from Lebanon in August of1982.
14. Reagan's' third report came with the placement of1,200 marines in
Lebanon as part ofa United Nations peace-keeping force designed to help the Lebanese
government gain control within its own borders. A supplemental report followed after
Marines were fired upon and two had been killed.
15. Reagan's fourth report came when he deployed several AWAC's (radar
planes) and F-15 fighters to help the government ofChad with their fight against
Libyan troops.
16. Reagan's fifth report happened when he deployed 5,000 marines, Army
Rangers and paratroopers to seize the island ofGrenada. The purpose was to protect
1,000 Americans endangered by an unstable situation.
17. As a response to numerous acts ofterrorism sponsored by Libya, Libya's
partial invasion ofChad and Mu'ammar Qaddafi laying claim to the entire GulfofSidra
as Libya's territorial waters, the United States became involved. The U.S. Navy
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requested to continue its "live-fire" exercises normally conducted within the Gulf.
Reagan knew Libya was prepared to fight. The Navy knew conflict was likely. The
plain terms of the War Powers Act should have been triggered. It was ignored.
Several Libyan jets were downed. Qadaffi withdrew from terrorist actions temporarily
and signaled his intent for a dialogue with the United States. Further sanctions against
Libya were halted. The success of the shootdown stopped any congressional effort to
invoke the War Powers Act.
18. Following the high-jacking of the cruise ship the Achille Lauro, the U.S.
chose to intercept the plane carrying the terrorists responsible (after having been set free
by the Egyptian government). The attempt was successful. No thought was given to
Congress or the War Powers Act. The president and his advisors never doubted their
authority to act under the president's role as Commander-in-Chief.
19. Terrorist activities continued after the Achille Lauro incident. Qadaffi' s
guilt in many of the acts was clearly indicated. Economic links with Libya were
broken, fifteen hundred Americans were asked to leave Libya. Libyan assets were
frozen and an executive order was now describing Libya as an "unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."
Soon after this, Reagan decided to target points within Libya for attack. The air
strike was a huge success. Once again the War Powers Act was irrelevant.
Consultation did happen but nothing resembling an official request for congressional
authorization ever took place. Since the mission was a complete success most
congressmen joined in the applause of the president and the armed forces.
Before we go to the last example of implementation, lets go back and take more
detailed look at some of the examples. For example, in number 5, President Ford
believed military force would be needed for rescue operations. Ford contacted eleven
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senators and ten House leaders about mentioning the need to prevent the moving of the
crew of the Mayaquez to the Cambodian mainland. As mentioned before, notification
of Congress came after the actions had been ordered.
Actions included a tactical air attack on a Cambodian air strip and selected other
targets on the mainland. On the evening of the airstrikes (just minutes before) Ford
was told the Mayaquez crew had been released and were back aboard the ship.
Minutes later the air strikes concluded.
The War Powers Act was given only cursory consideration. Congress was
informed after forces were in place and engaged in hostilities. There was no prior
consultation. Also overlooked was the fact that this action also violated the Cooper
Church Amendment preventing U.S. forces from entering Cambodia.
Members of Congress were furious and started to criticize Ford. Right at that
time polls came out showing overwhelming popular support for the president's actions.
On a complete reversal, members of both houses began praising the president's
decisive action. Sponsors of the War Powers Act were quoted as saying the action was
"bold and successful" or a "job well done." "The trampled War Powers Act was not
mentioned in the wave of political support. The president had acted under his authority
as Commander-in-Chief and entirely outside the framework of the act and in actual
violation of its provisions" (Lehman, 1992, p. 99).
In example number 9, (Carter's ill-fated hostage rescue), the result of the
mission and its effect on popular opinion set the congressional attitude toward the
president's violation of the War Powers Act. Congressional leadership was furious
over lack of consultation. Lloyd Cutler, an advisor to Carter, later wrote a response
stating; "The president's constitutional power to use the armed forces to rescue
Americans illegally detained abroad is clearly established. The War Powers Act
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should not be construed to require prior consultation under the precise circumstances of
this case" (Lehman, 1992, p. l O1). The facts of this case were similar to the Mayaquez
incident and in both cases the president ignored the War Powers Act. Ford was praised
because it was successful and Carter was criticized because of failure.
On example number 13 (Marines in Lebanon) Reagan referred to his action as
being consistent with the War Powers Resolution without citing any section under
which he was reporting. With the assassination of Lebanese President Gemayel,
requests for an increased multinational force were voiced. Many in Congress now
believed "imminent hostilities" were now likely. The executive stated such hostilities
were not "clearly indicated by the circumstances."
Reagan introduced 1,200 marines (example no. 14) and filed a report that the
troops were equipped for combat but would not "engage" in combat. Forcing the issue
by Congress acting through a joint resolution was not considered an option. Any bill
like that would be vetoed by the president and certainly upheld by at least one house.
Congress decided on a compromise that would activate Section 4(a) (1) and the 60 day
time limit but, contradictorily, granted the president statutory authorization for eighteen
months after its passage (House Joint Resolution 364).
The president, in effect, traded invocation of the War Powers Act for at least
eighteen months grace period from Congress. Even after signing the bill Reagan
attacked the legitimacy of the Act saying it wouldn't have any effect on his authority as
president to deploy armed forces if necessary. If the president had been true to his
speech he would have vetoed the bill. "The whole episode simply underlines the fact
that whatever the theory or the legislation, the struggle between the president and
Congress for control of national security always ends up fought on political rather than
constitutional or legal terrain" (Lehman, 1992, p.108).
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As a last comment on this event, a radio message was intercepted one week
prior to the killing of the 241 marines which stated; "If we kill fifteen marines the rest
will leave." This analysis was based on enemy awareness of the tenuous position of
the Americans in Lebanon.
By tying the trigger on the War Powers Resolution to such events as a terrorist
attack on American servicemen, Congress had inadvertently both surrendered
the initiative to anti-american radicals around the world and virtually placed a
'bounty' on the lives of American servicemen abroad" (Turner, 1992, p. 138144).

....

The attack on the marines had that exact effect. Before six months passed, the
• marines
had left and Reagan's policy was seen as a failure.
The unstable situation described in number 16 involved a classic textbook

-

marine and air assault of Grenada. Under pressure from the Senate Armed Services
Committee all forces were to be "joint" or "multi-service." This fact overruled the local
task force commander and forced him to add sections from the army and air force. We
ended up with 15,000 U.S. troops plus 300 soldiers from nearby
" countries. The
opposition consisted of 1,000 of Grenada's Revolutionary Army, several ill-trained
:.
militia and about 700 Cubans (636 of which were a military construction
crew). So

many different unrelated units were used that mistakes and unnecessary casualties were
almost expected.
Two hours after Reagan issued invasion orders he met with several members of
Congress. He stated the operation was justified on the basis of the president's powers
as Commander-in-Chief. One day after the invasion House speak.er Tip O'Niel

..

condemned the president for "gunboat diplomacy." Many congressmen called for
enforcement of the War Powers Act on the floor of Congress.
Leadership in the Democratic Party quickly passed Joint Resolution 402 which
established that a 60 time limit on presidential action" was initiated by the Grenada
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action. Suddenly Speaker O'Niel quickly changed his mind and publicly stated the
invasion was "justified". The belligerent demands for an inquiry into the president's
breach of the War Powers Act was dropped like a hot potato. Why? The public polls
showed a 90% approval rating for the president's actions. "Debate over constitutional
principles had once again been oveiwhelmed by political reality. Had the operation
been a fiasco, it would have been otheiwise" (Lehman, 1992, p. 112).
The last example or vignette will be given more attention as it is the most recent
event as of this writing and provides an excellent example of the executive-legislative
relations over how America goes to war.
20. Desert Storm was the United Nations led multinational force which
confronted Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein after their invasion of neighboring
Kuwait. President Bush ordered deployment of forces in August of 1990 in order to,
allegedly, protect American interests in Saudi Arabia and to aid Kuwait. The forces
were set into motion.
a. The Rapid Deployment force was in place and ready.
b. Twenty-six "positioning ships" arrived on the island of Diego Garcia.
c. Thirty-two modem airfields had finished construction in Saudi Arabia.
d. Members of Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force had trained extensively in
desert warfare.
e. A force or 120,000 were to be the initial operating force with steady
reinforcement from the United States and Europe as the need required.
Bush wrote Congress of these actions declaring the troops were not in
"imminent danger of hostilities." Was the president's action really related to the
situation? The U.S. Government had the most to fear from an attack by Iraq before
they were ready. Just a month later Bush declared Iraq and the United States were "on
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the brink of war." Soon after this was an administrative action that allowed our forces
l

•

to receive "imminent danger" pay. It seems apparent from these behaviors that Bush
was putting U.S. forces "in harm's way."
Under these conditions the War Powers Act could have either been triggered by
a more accurate presidential notification of Congress - obviously not
forthcoming - or a congressional debate on the issue. That did not take place.
Nor was there any effort in Congress to start the clock. Bush was therefore
able to operate in the initial stage of the military buildup quite free of
congressional restraint" (Lehman, 1992, p. 27).
As decisions to act aggressively drew near, military leaders said they needed a
larger buildup of forces. Bush and Secretary of State Baker continued to try and gain
unilateral support for the use of force. Meanwhile economic sanctions continued to try
and force Saddam to move out of Kuwait - unsuccessfully. Congress was, justifiably,
not ready to sanction the president's position on the use of force before its
adjournment.
• Most of them backed Senator Sam Nunn's position on "letting the
sanctions work."
Key members of Congress were trying to motivate the Bush administration to
continue with the Baker mission of diplomacy again even at the risk of pulling the rug
on the president's emphasis for using force. Baker did continue by setting a meeting
with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz on January
• 9th, days away from the "deadline"
given Saddam for leaving Kuwait.
Until Baker met with Aziz there had been no formal debate in Congress over
Gulf policy. The newly elected 102nd Congress resolved to keep it in session but not
to debate. In this way Congress continued to evade the issue. In theory the clock
should have started running the minute "hostilities" became "imminent."
Many thought
•
this situation existed at the beginning of deployment in August of 1990 - the Pentagon
treated it that way. Congress, though, refused to wind the clock.
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This state of"suspension" was Congress' fault (Lehman, 1992, p. 45). Debate
on the issue could have been scheduled at any time after deployment. The 101st
Congress, preparing for adjournment, decided not to debate the authoriz.ation of war.
Bush's talks with congressional leaders on several occasions sprang from his belief of
their political prudence and not their legal necessity.
Apparently most of Congress did not want war. They didn't want to be in the
way if war was necessary. Most members continued to support Sam Nunn's position
on letting the sanctions work.
The Democrats, therefore, took their ironic stand: not a decision to declare war
itself, for none was asked, but a decision on whether the United States should
'take the offensive' - a tactical issue that reasonably belonged to the
Commander-in-Chief even if the power to decide to go to war did not. It was a
position that appeared increasingly to give all of the game to Saddam unless
negotiations started - which even then might give much of the game to
Saddam!" (Lehman, 1992, p. 45-46).
The Judicial branch became involved at one point when fifty-six congressional
members led by Democrat Ron Dellums tried to bring a lawsuit. The idea was based
on the president's November 8th announcement of an"offensive option." This, they
thought, created a situation that insisted on a court injunction to prevent executive use
of force without congressional consent.
The Court acknowledged the position of Congress, i.e., that the president's
actions were clear enough to constitute preparations for war-making. The court stated;
"It is therefore clear that congressional approval is required if Congress desires to
become involved." The key point was when the court concluded. "It is only if a
majority of the Congress seeks relief from an infringement on its constitutional war
declaration power that it may be entitled to receive it" (Lehman, 1992, p. 48).
Obviously, if a majority of Congress could force an injunction from the court
they could also take the easier path of just denying the president the money to act. In
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reality almost every one of those fifty-six congressmen voted in favor of a bill for two
million dollars specifically for Desert Shield.
The congressional debate which finally took place did not focus on presidential
prerogatives {partly because the president had asked for support) but whether Congress
would support a possible war which would probably start on the January 15th deadline
- the timing and tactics of which would be left to the president. On January 12th
Congress voted to support the president.
Desert Storm seemed to take the last breath away from the War Powers
Resolution. The sixty day cut off period required by the Act came and went twice after
the president put armed forces in harm's way. Neither branch seemed to pay any heed.
Early on, it was obvious Congress was against military action and the president
was strongly for it.
In the end the president dominated the outcome when Congress backed down
and passed a resolution approving the use of force. They did so because they
felt the pressure of strong public support for military action. Had it been
otherwise, they would have blocked military action by including in the 1991
appropriation the words 'no funds in this or any other act shall be used ... etc.'
It was an almost perfect case study in how a government of divided and shared
powers goes to war" (Lehman, 1991, p. 53-54).
Summation and Conclusions
Several things can be seen by examining these incidents. To begin with, even
though reports were filed with Congress, the Presidents involved had clearly said that
each report did not substantiate their belief in the War Powers Act. They all avoided
stating that their reports were "pursuant to the requirements of the Act." They
considered these reports to be elective on their part and not mandatory (Holland, 1984).
The placement of armed forces is always warranted by citing the President's powers
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within the Constitution, either as Chief Executive, conductor of foreign relations or as
Commander-in-Chief.
One of the few examples where prior consultation took place was with
President Ford when he approached Congress on beginning a military operation. The
results were enlightening and educational. On April 10, 1975, Ford asked both
Houses of Congress to clarify their restrictions on using U.S. forces in Southeast Asia
for the specific purpose of protecting American lives by completing their evacuation if
that became necessary. Ford asked Congress to reply by April 19 because of what was
an acute and pressing situation. Following much debate, the Senate did manage to pass
a bill on April 25. On April 28, however, before the House took any initiative, Ford
ordered an evacuation to begin. He based his decision on "the President's
constitutional executive power and his authority as Commander-in-Chief of U.S.
Armed Forces." The House finally responded on May 1, rejecting the bill. Here
again, we see the structural inefficiencies within Congress demonstrating their inability
to successfully reach consensus on a timetable that is often short.
Another point which was mentioned in earlier paragraphs is the predictability
with which Congress reacts to the executive in the placement of armed forces in
conducting foreign affairs. If the placement and execution is successful, Congress
doesn't object; if it fails, Congress objects strenuously that the President did not
comply with the War Powers Act. The recapture of the Mayaquez and the takeover of
Grenada are recent examples of the former while the attempt to rescue hostages in Iran
and the costly placement of marines in Lebanon are examples of the latter.
The concept to be grasped here is that almost no congressman is going to
challenge a military operation that is speedy and successful. A drawn-out military
operation that doesn't enjoy widespread support will entertain a consistent
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congressional challenge. The reason for this criticism is not lack ofconsultation (it is
not even clear that congressmen really want to be consulted, for consultation implies
responsibility for the consequences) but lack ofsuccess. "Congress will not ignore the
existence ofpublic support for the President, regardless ofwhat the law says"
(Holland, 1984, p. 385).
The reality is that "public opinion tends to support the President in times of
military crisis whatever its views beforehand about the merits ofbecoming involved in
the crisis" (Wilson, 1983, p. 556-557). It seems that the War Powers Resolution has
made no distinct change in the way Congress has reacted to the executive's use of
armed forces in conducting foreign policy.
President Nixon believed several sections ofthe Act to be unconstitutional. He
thought it:
Would attempt to take away, by a mere legislative act, authorities which the
President has properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years ...
it would allow the Congress to eliminate certain authorities merely by the
passage ofa concurrent resolution - an action which does not normally have the
force oflaw, since it denies the President his constitutional role in approving
legislation (Holland, 1984, p. 386).
The Supreme Court sided with Nixon's viewpoint in June of 1983 when it
reviewed the case ofImmigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha In a vote of72 the Supreme Court held that the "legislative veto" allows Congress to legislate by
bypassing the procedures set out in Article One which stipulate that laws be passed by a
majority of both Houses and be presented to the President for passage. The Court
believed this to be an essential part ofthe Constitution's intentions regarding the
separation ofpowers.
The records ofthe Constitutional Convention reveal that the requirement that all
legislation be presented to the President before becoming law was uniformly
accepted by the Framers. Presentment to the President and the Presidential
Veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to
assure that these requirements could not be circumvented. During the final

debate on Article One, Section Seven, Clause Two, James Madison expressed
concern that it might be easily evaded by the simple expedient of calling a
proposed law a 'resolution' or 'vote' rather than a 'bill' ... the court's decision
based on the Presentment Clauses (Article One, Section Seven, Clauses Two
and Three) apparently invalidate every use of the legislative veto (Cushman,
1984, p. 118-120).
What effect has Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha had on
Congress' ability to force a withdrawal of U.S. forces by concurrent resolution? The
case renders the legislative veto unenforceable. Congress can no longer legislate by
concurrent resolution in such a fashion.
If Congress feels a report should be filed in a particular instance and the
president does not do so, or if the president places armed forces into a hostile situation
and Congress declines to authorize their presence within 60 days, there isn't any way,
within the context of the resolution that Congress can force the president into
accommodation. Congress' only other possibility would be to pass a joint resolution to
end the funding for the operation. This would, of course, be presented to the president
where he would sign or give Congress the opportunity to override his veto. This
option, though, was available to Congress before the War Powers Act was passed.
Recently there have been some changes in belief and attitude of congressional
members towards the War Powers Resolution. Thomas Eagleton, former Senator and
one who did not vote for the Resolution because he felt it didn't go far enough in
establishing legislative authority, stated;
Finally. ... I came to the conclusion that Congress really didn't want to be in on
the decisionmaking process as to when, how and where we go to war I came to
the conclusion that Congress really didn't want to have its fingerprints on
sensitive matters pertaining to putting our Armed Forces into hostilities. I came
to the conclusion that Congress preferred the right of retrospective criticism to
the right of anticipatory, participatory judgment. ... I harbor the notion that
most Senators and House members don't have the political stomach for
decisionmaking involving war (Turner, 1991, p. 160).
Several congressmen (Majority Leader Robert Byrd, Armed Services
Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, Congressman John Warner and Senator George
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Mitchell) have prepared changes to the Act. In so proposing, George Mitchell made the
following statements in Congress;
We have spent countless hours proposing, filibustering and debating the
measures to invoke a law - rather than assessing the wisdom of the policy that
prompted the deployment of forces. We have rarely reached a consensus, but
we have often conveyed the appearance of a divided country. In doing so we
have undermined the positive role that Congress can and should play in crucial
national policy decisions. ... The [Byrd, Nunn, Warner, Mitchell proposal]
joint resolution is based on the premise that the War Powers Resolution does
not work because it oversteps the constitutional bounds of Congress' power to
control the Armed Forces in situations short of war and because it potentially
undermines our ability to effectively defend our national interests. By enabling
Congress to require - by its own inaction - the withdrawal of troops from a
situation of hostilities, the resolution unduly restricts the authority granted by
the Constitution to the president as Commander-in-Chief ... the Constitution
grants to Congress the exclusive authority to declare war, as well as the
responsibility to provide for the common defense. But the constitution makes
the president Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. That authority gives
him the power to direct the Armed Forces and repel attacks against the United
States. Our Founding Fathers divided these war powers to enable the president
to effectively lead while ensuring that Congress would concur in the weighty
decision of war. But this deliberate division of powers was effectively ignored
in the Korean and Vietnam wars, wars waged without a congressional
declaration• of war. ... Although portrayed as an effort 'to fulfill - not to alter,
amend or adjust - the intent of the framers of the
• U.S. Constitution', the War
Powers Resolution actually expands Congress' authority beyond the power to
declare war to the power to limit troop deployment in situations short of war ...
the
• president as Commander-in-Chief has authority to deploy troops in defense
of American interests. His constitutional authority should not be subject to an
automatic recall of American forces within 90 days ... furthermore, debate over
the Resolution conveys the appearance of a divided America that lacks resolve
and staying power. The Resolution severely undercuts the president by
encouraging our enemies to simply wait for U.S. law to remove the threat of
... . American military action. Into the very situation that requires national
further
...
steadiness
and resolve, the War Powers Resolution introduces doubt and
uncertainty. This does not serve our nation. The War Powers Resolution
therefore threatens not only the delicate balance of power established by the
Constitution, it potentially undermines America's ability to effectively defend
our national security (Turner, 1991, p. 162-163).
Even though many legislators are having second thoughts doesn't mean they
won't use the Act when the president commits troops in a dangerous situation and
mistakes happen. "Even a non-functioning (and unconstitutional) law can serve
political purposes if the situation becomes sufficiently dangerous. That may be why,
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despite the widespread acknowledgement of its infirmities by congressional leaders, the
War Powers Resolution remains on the statute books" (Turner, 1991, p. 164).
The sections of the War Powers Resolution discussed in this chapter contain
ample argument regarding their questionable constitutionality. The historical track
record given in previous chapters gives weight to these arguments so that one may
conclude that the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (ineffective as it may have been since
its inception) should be repealed.
In conducting research one should retain a focus of objectivity. "Objective"
research may still take the form of facts, logical relationships, correlations etc. and still
support a single point of view. It is within this chapter I have departed from any
objectivity and focused on such a blatant violation of the U.S. Constitution.
The last chapter goes back to where the truth may be found; the origins of our
Constitution, our Founding Fathers and the individuals who influenced them. It is
with this in mind that the closing argument is made and conclusions reached in this on
going debate between the executive and legislative branches.

CHAPTER VIII
WAR POWERS REVISITED AND PRINCIPLES
OF FREE GOVERNMENT
As discussed in Chapter II, the Constitution is often vague on the specific
assignment of powers between the legislative and executive branches. Article One,
Section One, states "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States. Article Two, establishing the executive branch states "The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States." This is a
significant difference.
Article One, Section eight gives Congress the power to "regulate commerce
with foreign nations," to "raise and support armies" and to "provide and maintain a
navy." It does not, however, give broad blanket power to "power to provide for the
common defense". This same section states Congress shall "have the power to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the general
welfare of the United States." The reference to the common defense is obviously a
purpose for which revenues may be raised and not an independent grant of substantial
power to create any legislation Congress wishes to provide for the common defense.
Yes, you could say these and other powers are shared but this would be
inaccurate. For example, the president and the Senate both have a role in the treaty
making process, however,
For the Senate to assume the negotiation function, to interpret the international
effect of a treaty or to bring an approved treaty into international legal effect by
transmitting it to the United Nations is simply wrong. It would be akin to
saying that, since both the president and Senate have a role in the appointment
process, the Senate may assume the function of nominating cabinet officials and
then appointing them over the president's objections. A far more useful
120
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analysis, in both instances (appointment process and common defense), is
to recognize
that the president, Senate and the Congress each have certain,
•
specific powers that influence U.S. foreign relations with the external
world" (Turner, 1991, p. 50-51).
We know declaring war is an option for Congress while the President is given
the leading role for conducting diplomacy and managing hostilities. It seems that with
the power to conduct negotiations, so also, in practice, goes the power to engage in
hostilities (Franck & Weisband, 1979). Historical events shown in Chapters III, N,
and V show a presidential dominance in managing hostilities (those situations involving
use of force or where potential for violence exists).
The Commander-in-Chief clause seems to be the executive's "trump card" for
taking such initiative. Alexander Hamilton, however, in number 69 of the Federalist
Papers, thought the power "would amount to nothing more than the supreme command
and direction of the military and naval forces." Hamilton contrasted this power to the
British King and his unlimited power in declaring war and raising and regulating
armies and navies.
Records of the constitutional convention are not enlightening as to what the
authors meant by "Commander-in-Chief." This could be construed to have meant that
the title wasn't intended to be of much consequence. But then James Madison and
Governor Morris perhaps would not have moved to substitute the word "declare" for
"make" in Article One. Their idea was to remove from Congress and assign to the
presidency "the power to repel sudden attacks".
The authors in Article One, section 10, gave the power to the states to use their
militia in self-defense or to repel an invasion without waiting for Congress to declare
war. Could they have meant to give the President less power than a state governor?
What this shows is that, in giving Congress the exclusive power to "declare" war, they
were not unaware of the possibility that America might become involved in hostilities in
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other ways. Most recent presidents and their lawyers claim unlimited presidential ·
power to begin hostilities (Franck & Weisband, 1979). The support for this isn't from
the Constitution but from practice. "Between 1700 and 1870, declarations of war prior
to hostilities only occurred in one case out of ten, and such declarations were also very
rare after operations of war had been commenced" (Turner, 1983, p.38).
Abraham Chayes, a former State Department legal advisor, claimed that as far
back as 1789 the practice of declaring war was already a decaying formality. "Recent
studies indicate that during the century preceding the Constitutional Convention 'wars
were frequent but very seldom declared.' Thus it is argued, the power to declare war is
no more than a role in an obsolete formalistic charade" (Franck & Weisband, 1979, p.
65). Undeclared wars are now commonplace.
In earlier chapters we have seen the growing dominance of the executive in the
controlling of U.S. forces abroad. These numerous examples tend to make it futile to
say that presidential war-making is unconstitutional regardless of what the Constitution
says because of such a regular practice of it without any meaningful challenge from
Congress.
If any challenge did come from Congress certainly it would have been in the
form of withholding funds. Ever since the Mexican War, initiated by President Polk
without prior congressional approval, it has been argued that funds voted by Congress
to support a war make up a "retroactive congressional ratification" (Franck &
Weisband, 1979).
The authors of the Constitution "did convey a strong impression that a military
appropriation, passed for a specific purpose, could constitute legislative approval for
the use of force authorized to accomplish the purpose contemplated" (Sofaer, 1976, p.
57). More recently, presidents seemed to have claimed that by merely approving the
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general annual budget appropriation for the Department of Defense, that congressional
approval for a presidential war already exists.
As described in Chapter VI, the 1970's "undeclared war'' syndrome had started
to change. The Vietnam War was reaching lengthy proportions unlike anything since
the American Revolution. Much of Congress and the public at large became
disillusioned with the war.
It is ironic that such a congressional surge of power should arise from a
reaction to the Vietnam War. The war was not a bad or excessive example of the
executive overstepping the "war powers". In 1955 the Senate consented to the
ratification of a treaty that engaged America in assisting the non-communist nations of
lndo-China to defend themselves against armed aggression. "The Senate report
accompanying that treaty establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that this was
recognized to be a major new military commitment for the United States" (Turner,
1991, p. xii).
In 1964 Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which gave President
Johnson authorization to do anything necessary, including the use of armed force, to
help South Vietnam. It was later overturned, but for years it allowed the president to
operate virtually carte blanche. Congress then consistently voted funds for the next ten
years.
Presidential Prerogative
A belief which illustrates the American political system is that all uses of power
by the government must be related to a specific clause in the Constitution. The 10th
amendment provides that "Powers not delegated to the United States by the
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Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reseIVed for the states, respectively,
or to the people" (U.S. Constitution, 1776, p. 18).
The Supreme Court case of Ex parte Merryman stated that
• our government is
one of delegated powers and limited powers. It exists through the Constitution. Also,
no branch should use any of the powers of government except those powers specified
and granted. If this is true, did President Truman
• have the authority to send U.S.
troops into Korea without congressional authorization? Did President Kennedy have
the power to run a blockade in the Cuban missile crisis, or for that matter, to invade
Cuba? Some presidents have claims which cannot be directly related to specific
legislation or constitutional provisions. Examples include the impoundment of funds,
use of an executive order to alter legislation or spending funds for initiating hostilities
without any congressional declaration of war.
Can you call these actions encroachments of power or does the president have
"prerogative?'' Prerogative according to Locke is the "power to act according to
discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes
even against it" (Turner, 1991, p. 53). What is prerogative power? John Locke
discusses several types of prerogative in Chapter 14 of his Second Treatise on
Government. The following four quotes are from that Treatise. The first deals with
emergency situations.
For the Legislators not being able to foresee, and provide, by laws, for all, that
may be useful to the Community, the Executor of the Laws, having the power
in his hands, has by the Common Law of Nature, a right to make use of it, for
the good of the Society, in many cases, where the municipal law has given no
direction, till the Legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it
(Turner, 1991, p. 59).
This quote above refers to domestic power. The idea expressed is that the
executive should be allowed to act when Congress is not in session. But, prerogative
isn' t restricted to "executive measures pending legislative action."
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Many things there are which the Law can by no means provide for, and those
must necessarily be left to the discretion of him, that has the executive power in
his hands, to be ordered by him, as the public good and advantages shall
require.
A second type of prerogative concerns the intrinsic imperfection of law; its
generality. These are situations when individuals "on the scene" need to make
decisions. The law can only set general parameters. The executive should be able to
exercise discretion within these parameters.
A third type of prerogative is based on the idea that execution of the law could
bring about "positive harm."
Tis fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the Executive
Power, or rather to this Fundamental Law of Nature and Government. That as
much as may be, all the Members of Society are to be preserved.
Below, John Locke refers to the example of pardoning power. This power is
exclusively the President's conferred upon him by the Constitution.
For since many accidents may happen, wherein a strict and rigid observation of
the Laws may do harm; (as not to pull down an innocent man's house to stop
the fire, when the house next to it is burning) and a man come sometimes
within the reach of the Law, which makes no distinctions of persons, by an
action that may deserve reward and pardon; tis fit the Ruler should have a
Power, in many cases, to mitigate the severity of the Law and pardon some
offenders.
If the law is rigidly adhered to it could result in "positive harm." Locke is
saying that the executive must occasionally act outside or against the law. Locke
obviously believed the legislature should have resources available for "checking"
abuses by the executive. Congress can pass legislation for as many matters or
contingencies as possible or supersede the executive when abuses do occur. The
legislature cannot, however, according to Locke, displace prerogative on the whole,
but it may override a particular case (Holland, 1984).
President Lincoln during the Civil War took actions which were questionable as
to their statutory and constitutional authority. A Supreme Court justice called Lincoln's
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suspension ofhabeas corpus unconstitutional. Lincoln stated that the Constitution
doesn't say which branch has the power to suspend. The ChiefJustice replied by
asking Lincoln how a duly elected official, who must take care that the laws be
faithfully executed, could disobey the law. Lincoln stated he could violate one law so
that the remaining laws are faithfully executed.
Richard Nixon used a similar argument when he impounded appropriated funds
to control inflation. President Truman seized steel mills during the Korean War to avert
a strike which would have hurt the war effort. Regarding this action, the Supreme
Court case ofYoungstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer held that because
Congress had already rejected the idea ofseized after serious consideration, Truman
had to give back operation of the mills to the owners. Truman, though, thought that
legislative action in the area oflabor disputes was not as important as the duty to protect
American personnel in battle.
In the Supreme Court case ofUnited States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation, involving the sanctioning ofan arms embargo, Justice Sutherland spoke
on governmental prerogative.
The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as
are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is
categorically true only in respect ofour internal affairs (p. 7).
What is being said here is that foreign policy powers are
Intrinsic to the nature ofsovereignty. The government possesses them
independently ofa constitutional grant. Congress can delegate these powers to
the President and the Constitution gives him power to preserve the sovereignty
ofthe United States. Sutherland's opinion is not, however, a source for
executive prerogative, because he says the President's foreign policy powers
derive from the Constitution. The President per se has not extra-constitutional
power to deal with foreign affairs. Only the federal government has such
power outside the Constitution. The Constitution gives him a power that does
not itselfhave a constitutional basis (Holland, 1984, p. 395).
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Kenneth Holland, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University ofVennont
believes the Constitution needs to allow for substantial executive power to deal with
war. To keep away from a monarchy one needs to stay away from war. As
complexity of foreign affairs increases, defense and war increases. This, he believes,
will allow for a natural rise in presidential power.
The President might sometimes have to roam outside the Constitution, to act on
the basis of power unauthorized by it, even to disregard certain portions of it, in
order to achieve that higher purpose of preserving it and the nation it
establishes. The Constitution, moreover, like all law, is itself a means, an
instrument to a superior object - security of those unalienable rights for the sake
of which governments are instituted among men (Holland, 1984, p. 395).
Conclusions
In stating conclusions I do not wish to continuously repeat data given in earlier
chapters. The amount of data is significant enough i.e., constitutional discussions,
natural growth of the executive, executive-congressional foreign affairs involvement
regarding events containing the use of force or violence, use of statutory and executive
agreements, funding sources and inherent structural weaknesses of the legislature in
conducting foreign affairs.
What all this material documents is what has happened in the past. The actions
of individual presidents has expanded executive power. It became clear to members of
Congress and others that certain foreign policy situations demanded executive direction
and oversight. Congress has repeatedly allowed and even encouraged these executive
initiatives.
The tools used by government (treaties, statutory and executive agreements
etc.) show evidence of the evolving congressional-executive relationship. Inherent
structural weaknesses within Congress have also offered reasons as to their support or
encouragement of executive initiatives and hence, executive growth.
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Examples ofcongressional attempts to strengthen their influence in foreign
policy {1970's) were primarily reactions to the Indo-China War. Here we come to an
important point. Should Congress have recourse or "checks" to curb executive
actions? Yes they should - in a given situation. Should Congress be able to have
blanket authority to limit executive action in future events or situations? Absolutely
not. This is exactly what the War Powers Resolution attempted to do. Beyond all this
we come to specific reasons which clearly show the War Powers Resolution of1973,
to be unconstitutional. Indeed, it should be repealed.
Upon reading the Resolution, it appears to have the effect oflaw. Ifthis is true
it is an encroachment upon independent presidential powers. Quoting again from
Chapter VIII,
Under the Constitution, as long as Congress provides the Commander-in-Chief
with an army or navy it is his to deploy and utilize as he deems necessary with
the single exception that ifhe concludes it is necessary to initiate offensive war
against another state, he must first obtain the statutory approval ofboth houses
of Congress (Turner, 1991, p. 110).
Does this seem to be on the same wave length as Section 3 ofthe Act which
demands that the president consult with Congress whenever possible prior to
committing armed forces? Keep Congress informed yes, but to compel the president to
do so? It is well known that in constitutional law Congress cannot force the president
to suppty·sensitive national security material that in his estimation should be held within
the executive branch.
Section 4 demands detailed reports within forty-eight hours ofwhenever U.S.
forces are placed into "hostilities." These "deails" deal with the scope and duration of
military operations which Congress treats as a legally binding commitment. Ifthe
president departs from them (which conditions may force him to do) Congress would
be quick to accuse him oflying or breaking the law.
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Section 5 {b) again, demands the president withdraw forces from any situation
where "imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances" if
Congress hasn't acted to authorize their ongoing presence within 62 days. We know
the president must have approval ofboth houses ofCongress in advance ofinitiating a
conflict. Like all other exceptions to the presidents powers, the power to declare war
was intended to be viewed narrowly. Although it allows Congress to prevent a
presidential action to start an offensive action, it does not allow Congress the power to
take control ofthe president's independent constitutional powers simply on the idea that
any executive mistakes might bring another state to begin aggression against the United
States.
Also, what message are we sending to other nations. Consider yourselfan ally
or enemy ofthe United States or even a country wishing to align itselfwith America.
You discover that the president's powers as Commander-in-Chiefare good for only
several months. After that a huge, unorganized legislature is in command. We
discover that Congress has determined in advance, ifit can't make up its mind whether
the president is right or wrong, it will assume as a matter oflaw that he is wrong.
The judicial branch has had its impact also. Consider the case ofImmigration
and Naturalization Service v. Chadha which determined the "legislative veto" effect ofa
concurrent resolution allows Congress to legislate by bypassing the procedures set out
in Article One which stipulate that laws must be passed by a majority ofboth houses of
Congress and be presented to the president for passage. This case renders the
legislative veto unenforceable. These arguments coupled with foreign policy history
which documents the growth and initiative allowed and sometimes given to the
executive by Congress stands in total contrast to the actions ofthe 1970's where
Congress attempted to limit the president's powers as Commander-in-Chief.
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Ultimately I believe it is constitutional interpretation which shows the War
Powers Resolution of 1973 to be unconstitutional. The discussion in Chapter VIII
illustrates this. John Locke was a primary influence on many of our founding fathers.
His ideas and beliefs permeate much of what is now contained in the Constitution.
Presidential prerogative in its several contexts, i.e. emergency situations, law and its
generality and the concept of"positive harm," give the president the ability to, if
needed, act outside the realm of the Constitution, even disregard it in order to achieve
the higher aim of preserving it and the nation it represents.
We have examined and contemplated our constitutional foundations regarding
foreign policy between the executive and legislative branches, the historical practice of
presidential dominance in managing events involving violence or use of force, the
natural growth of the executive branch, inherent structural weaknesses of Congress
and constitutional interpretations on presidential prerogative. The question on the
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 should be clear.
Although the Resolution's constitutionality and its use have not been on the
front burner of American politics for some time, its importance is not diminished.
Even though many congressional members are having second thoughts about it doesn't
mean they won't invoke its powers. "Even a non-functioning (and unconstitutional)
law can serve political purposes if the situation becomes sufficiently dangerous. That
may be why, despite the widespread acknowledgement of its infirmities by
congressional leaders, the War Powers Resolution remains on the statute books"
(Turner, 1991, p. 164).
Today, with the downfall of the Soviet Union bringing an end to the cold war,
America is reevaluating its military role in world affairs. Gone may be the days of
massive, overwhelming firepower. Ethnic and national tensions have broken out all
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over Europe and the Middle East. Creating "safe havens," "no-fly zones,"
"humanitarian relier' and working with allies to intimidate but not actually engage
aggressors is how America will be projecting much of its power in the future. As of
this writing, the situation of ethnic cleansing taking place in Yugoslavia is an example
of how the United Nations and other countries are determining policy which may or
may not involve U.S. troops.
Many believe the true measure of America's diplomatic clout will always be the
military resources we are willing to commit. For the United States to speak with a
unified voice, make decisions on what is often a short timetable and avoid legislative
micro-management of foreign policy, presidential prerogative should not be binded by
congressional restraint.
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